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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
In 2011, both Major League Baseball (MLB) and the National Football League 
(NFL) saw the expiration of their collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) between the 
players’ unions and owners. Without an agreement in place, the two leagues would have 
been unable to play the next season. The CBAs established basic contract provisions, 
pensions and other benefits for players, and, most importantly, granted players the right 
to move between teams at their own discretion and outlined the manner in which they 
could do so. This process of changing teams was known as free agency. 
As the two most popular sports leagues in the United States, MLB and the NFL 
generated $6.1 billion and $9.3 billion in revenue, respectively, in 2010.1 Countless 
children played the games in their home towns, hoping to one day play professionally and 
tens of millions of fans attended games each year. A long-term work stoppage could 
harm that popularity and in doing so could cause a significant reduction in revenue if it 
extended into the regular season and resulted in the loss of games.  
While the 2011 negotiations both focused largely around issues like player safety 
and the fair sharing of the billions of dollars in revenue in each league, negotiations for 
earlier CBAs had been over very different issues. Free agency, or the freedom to choose 
                                                 
1
 Cork Gaines, “NFL Is Still King Among American Sport Fans,” Business Insider Sports Page, 21 Oct. 
2011, http://articles.businessinsider.com (accessed 17 Apr. 2012); Doris Burke, Brian Hendrickson, and 
Daniel Roberts, “The Gross Football Product” Sports Illustrated, 14 Mar. 2011, 
http://www.sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault (accessed 17 Apr. 2012); Forbes.com, “MLB Team Values: The 
Business of Baseball,” 22 Mar. 2011, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2011/33/baseball-valuations-
11_land.html (accessed 17 Apr. 2012). 
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where they worked, was not always a part of professional sports. Previously, players had 
been bound to a single team for life and they had no way to move to another team if they 
felt that they were being unfairly treated. As this issue of fair treatment was slowly 
resolved, the players were able to shift their focus to profit sharing, safety, and other 
issues.  
In an effort to fight the owners and their oppressive restrictions, the players in 
both leagues formed unions, the NFL Players Association (NFLPA) and the MLB Players 
Association (MLBPA). The unionization of wealthy groups of young men who were paid 
a great deal more than the average American seemed strange. Usually, unions represented 
the working class in difficult and under-paid jobs such as autoworkers or teachers. They 
protected their members from abuse by owners and management, usually in regards to 
compensation, work conditions, and rights regarding the industry in which they worked. 
Because of their specialized skills, professional athletes were generally well paid 
compared to typical Americans. They were also being paid to play a game and many 
people considered that to be a privilege. Yet they still faced similar issues to other labor 
unions. They wanted the right to work where they saw fit, to earn a fair wage with respect 
to the profitability of the industry, and to have rules and systems in place which would 
ensure their safety and well-being. They also wanted something that would seem 
common to most workers: the ability to leave an undesirable job and find similar 
employment elsewhere at a similar wage. 
In order to maintain league stability, the CBAs are used by both sides to negotiate 
everything from the number of practices during a week to the different provisions which 
can be placed into a player’s contract. CBAs are a very normal part of labor negotiations, 
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regardless of the industry. Whenever they expire, the labor representatives and owners 
meet to discuss the success and failures of the previous agreement and how to structure 
the next one. When those negotiations go well, they do not take much time. When there 
are difficulties, they can extend for some time. In extreme cases, they can result in 
lockouts or strikes, which may cost both sides money: owners through lost revenue and 
laborers through lost wages.  
In CBA negotiations, owners are try to keep their costs down by keeping players’ 
salaries down. They also strive to create fairness between all of the teams. The wealthiest 
owners might not want a fair system because they could simply purchase their success, 
but the majority of the owners want a system which provides each team with a chance for 
success. Part of that fairness between teams is restricting the movement of labor. This has 
been done in the NFL and MLB by creating player drafts, utilizing processes such as 
salary arbitration, and restrictions on free agency among others. 
Laborers, in this case players, take almost the exact opposite stance. They want to 
maximize their own income, which comes mostly from their salary. However, when they 
have only one team that offers them a salary, they must take it or leave it no matter how 
much it is. Free agency gives them the ability to play for the team which offers them the 
best contract arrangement. By competing for the services of players, the owners drive the 
overall salary up and the cost of owning a team increases tremendously. Players also are 
less concerned with fair competition between teams because they want the teams that can 
spend the most to inject as much money as possible into the market.  
The two leagues have both found financial success but by balancing the desires of 
the players and owners in very different ways. The NFL has morphed into a very 
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egalitarian league where teams share revenue and are restricted in their spending. The 
NFL has a salary cap and floor which protect the owners from spending too much on 
players but also guarantee the players a minimum total salary. Baseball has no such 
limitations, and some players make nearly as much as entire teams in the league.  
The salary cap and floor create parity within the NFL because the wealthiest 
teams cannot simply buy the best players with the most lucrative contracts. This parity is 
demonstrated by the fact that all but one of the league’s 32 teams have made the playoffs 
in the past ten years and all but four have made it in the past five years. In baseball, six of 
the 30 teams have not reached the playoffs in a decade and two have not done so in over 
25 years. The wealthiest teams in baseball are able outspend the poorer teams and 
therefore have the best players, form the best teams and win the most games. The poorer 
teams are forced to find success by using young players who have not yet proven that 
they are worth expensive contracts and older players who are past their prime.  
November of 1892 was when the first player was paid to play football. William 
Heffelfinger received $500, or about $12,000 in today’s money, to play in one game for 
the Allegheny Athletic Association (AAA) against the Pittsburgh Athletic Club (PAC). 
The very next year, the Pittsburgh Athletic Club signed the first player to a contract for 
multiple games. By 1896, an entire team of professional players was fielded by the AAA, 
and the next year the Latrobe Athletic Association played its entire season with 
professional players.2 
By 1920, professional football faced several problems: the frequency of players 
moving from team to team in order to follow the highest bid for their playing services, 
                                                 
2
 NFL.com, “Chronology of Professional Football.” 2011 NFL Record & Fact Book (New York: Time Inc. 
Home Entertainment, 2011), 348, http://www.nfl.com/history, (accessed 2 Dec. 2011). 
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the subsequent rise in salaries due to bidding wars between teams and the use of college 
students in professional games. In order to combat these problems by creating 
consistency in the rules, ten teams from four states agreed to form the American 
Professional Football Association, which would eventually become the NFL. For the 
1920 season, there was little organization among the teams in the APFA and little done to 
solve the problems for which it had been created. This changed for the 1921 season. 
Between the 1920 and 1921 seasons, the league wrote a league constitution which, 
among other things, limited the movement of players between teams.3 
1935 marked the beginning of the college draft. Previously, college players could 
sign with any team that they chose. With the draft, the teams each drafted the rights to 
different players. The first game to be shown on television occurred on October 22, 1939 
between the Brooklyn Dodgers and Philadelphia Eagles. In 1946, the NFL became more 
nationally relevant with the movement of the Cleveland Rams to Los Angeles.4  
The 1960s saw a large increase in player salaries and improvements in player 
treatment. Two of the reasons were the establishment of a players’ union in 1956, and the 
emergence of the American Football League (AFL) in 1959.5 The AFL provided a 
competitor for the NFL which drove up the cost of both veteran and rookie players.6 The 
AFL also competed with the NFL for the attention of fans by starting teams in cities 
which for the most part did not have a NFL presence and by offering a different, more 
                                                 
3
 Ibid, 348-9.  
4
 Ibid, 350-52. 
5
 Michael MacCambridge, America’s Game: The Epic Story of How Pro Football Captured a Nation (New 
York: Anchor Books, 2005), 316. 
6
 Ibid. 
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exciting style of play.7 The NFLPA was established in 1956 and began to fight for 
players’ rights. The NFLPA fought for an increase in salary to match the league’s 
increase in revenue. Despite the growing success of the NFL, players were paid a pittance 
compared to professional players in other sports.8  
In June of 1966 the AFL and NFL merged to form a 26 team league with plans to 
expand further in the near future. The merger eliminated many of the competitive 
advantages which the players had previously exploited for higher salaries. There was now 
but one draft, and therefore no competition among teams for new talent. The ability to 
leave a team in one league for a team in the other was eliminated as well.9 
The NFL had rules which prevented the movement of players and with the 
merger, these rules would apply to all football players. The option clause and the Rozelle 
rule combined to make the movement of players between teams very difficult. Under 
these rules, teams had the ability to retain a player for an extra year beyond his contract 
for only 90 percent of his previous salary. Then if he wanted to sign with another team, 
that team was required to compensate his previous team. If the teams could not come to 
an agreement, then Pete Rozelle, the NFL Commissioner, would decide for the teams 
what was fair compensation. These restrictions stilted player movement among teams.10 
In 1974, the players went on strike in an attempt to earn an increase in their 
salaries. Among their demands were the removal of the amateur draft, removal of the 
Rozelle rule and the option clause, and guaranteed salaries. Essentially the players 
                                                 
7
 Ibid, 120. 
8
 Ibid, 316. 
9
 Ibid, 216-228. 
10
 Ibid, 293. 
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wanted the ability to choose where they would play: free agency. With this strike and 
what the players were fighting for, a new era in labor negotiations had begun.  
While football was just emerging as a sport of national prominence, baseball had 
been established as the national pastime. The rules were originally invented in 1839 by 
Abner Doubleday and the first official game was played seven years later. 1869 marked 
the first time that a team of entirely paid players played a game, and eight years later, the 
first professional league, dubbed the National League, was formed. During the 1880s and 
1890s, issues such as bribery and race first became issues within the league.11  
Generally a baseball contract at this time was short lived, lasting between a single 
game and a full season. In 1879, the eight owners of the National League agreed with 
each other to choose five players off of each of their rosters which the other teams would 
be unable to sign. These five players would be “reserved” for the previous owner.12 Thus 
the reserve system was born. By 1969, the number of reserved players would expand to 
40. The only time that any of these players changed teams was when they were traded or 
purchased. The reserve system and its restriction on player’s rights would remain a major 
part of the labor situation in baseball for nearly 100 years.  
The American League was created in 1900 and by 1903 the two leagues had 
joined together to form Major League Baseball. The first World Series was played that 
year to determine a champion between the two leagues, although it would not be played 
the following year. In 1912, the players went on strike against the owners for the first 
time. Racism continued to mar the game. 1916 saw the first black player of the 20th 
                                                 
11Rob Neyer, “Two Distinct Periods of Gambling,” ESPN: the Magazine, 7 Jan. 2004, 
http://www.espn.go.com, (accessed 20 Apr. 2012). 
12
 Brad Snyder, A Well-Paid Slave: Curt Flood’s Fight for Free Agency in Professional Sports (New York: 
Penguin, 2007), 2. 
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century, Jimmy Claxton, expelled from the league because of his race. No other black 
player would play in the Major Leagues until 1945.13  
In the 1920s the first baseball game to be broadcast on the radio brought the game 
to more people than ever before. The league also tried to limit the ability of players to 
barnstorm – that is, travel across the country playing baseball during the offseason. In 
order to keep profits high, the owners wanted spectators to visit the home stadiums and 
pay for the tickets to the game. Barnstorming allowed spectators to see the game for free 
or to pay the players directly, rather than purchasing tickets from the owners. In 1922, 
Babe Ruth was suspended for ignoring an order from the commissioner of baseball to 
stop barnstorming in the offseason. By 1930, he had signed the largest baseball contract 
to date: $80,000 per year. 
The 1940s saw the integration of baseball with Jackie Robinson in 1945 and Larry 
Dobby in 1948 breaking the color barriers in the National League and American League 
respectively. From the 1920s until the integration of MLB, black players had only been 
allowed to play in the Negro Leagues.14 1947 was the first year in which the World Series 
was televised as the popularity of the game continued to grow across the nation. Ten 
years later, the Major Leagues reached the west coast when the Brooklyn Dodgers and 
New York Giants moved to Los Angeles and San Francisco. 
The examination of labor negotiations in professional sports has covered almost 
every issue involved in the Collective Bargaining Agreements. Free agency used to be 
one of the key issues to these negotiations, but has since become a commonly accepted 
                                                 
13
 William C. Rhoden, Forty Million Dollar Slaves: The Rise, Fall, and Redemption of the Black Athlete 
(New York: Three Rivers Press, 2006), 113. 
14
 Ibid, 100. 
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part of sports. However, there are still issues at play in the current CBAs for the NFL and 
MLB which have an impact on the rights and restrictions of players who wish to change 
teams. 
A Well –Paid Slave, by Brad Snyder, is the biography of Curt Flood, the first 
baseball player to sue Major League Baseball for the right to choose his own team and 
break the power of the reserve system. Snyder argues that, while Flood’s suit ultimately 
lost in the Supreme Court, his efforts led to the abolition of the reserve system and the 
establishment of free agency in Major League Baseball. In the decades since Flood’s 
decision to fight MLB, the rights of players have expanded dramatically.15  
In 1997, Jeffrey S. Moorad argued against the owners and the reserve clause in 
“Major League Baseball’s Labor Turmoil: The Failure of the Counter-Revolution.” His 
main point was that the actions of owners throughout the history of MLB created distrust 
on the part of the players, especially with the creation of the reserve clause. Moorad 
explained how the owners were able to maintain the reserve system by obtaining 
exceptions to antitrust legislation. This poor treatment at the hands of the owners caused 
the players to create the Players Association in order to gain bargaining power.16  
At the same time, Marc Chalpin offered a more owner-friendly view of the history 
of baseball in “It Ain’t Over ‘Til It’s Over: The Century Long Conflict between the 
Owners and the Players in Major League Baseball.” While he did not advocate a 
complete return to the reserve system, Chalpin said that player salaries were escalating 
too quickly, and that the power of the players had gotten out of hand. Owners could not 
                                                 
15
 Snyder, A Well-Paid Slave, 349. 
16
 Jeffrey S. Moorad, “Major League Baseball’s Labor Turmoil: The Failure of the Counter-Revolution,” 
Villanova Sports & Entertainment Law Journal, vol. 4 (1997), 53-86, http://home.heinonline.org/ (accessed 
10 Oct. 2011). 
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keep up with the rapidly rising salaries of not only exceptional players, but the average 
ones as well. Chalpin also agreed that distrust and hatred between owners and players 
contributed to difficult negotiations.17 
In “Labor Issues in Professional Sports: Reflections on Baseball, Labor, and 
Antitrust Law” William B. Gould IV examines baseball free agency, salary arbitration 
and antitrust law. He focuses on the issue of a salary cap and whether baseball will soon 
be forced to adopt a model similar to those used in the NFL and National Basketball 
Association. Gould also argues that labor negotiations seem to be moving in a peaceful 
direction where management and players will be able to settle disputes without labor 
interruptions or major controversies.18 
In 2002, Scott Backman outlined the history of NFL labor turmoil in “NFL 
Players Fight for Their Freedom: The History of Free Agency in the NFL.” Players 
fought the NFL for the right to play for any team that they chose. Similarly to the early 
MLB owners, the NFL owners agreed to only sign certain players. Any player who left 
for another football league was subsequently blacklisted from the NFL. The NFL also 
had a draft rule which, similarly to the reserve clause in MLB, prevented NFL players 
from leaving one team for another on their own volition.19 
Each of these articles outlines a slightly different aspect of the rise of free agency 
from labor negotiations in the NFL and MLB. They all fail to analyze the shift in 
                                                 
17
 Marc Chalpin, “It Ain’t Over ‘Til It’s Over: The Century Long Conflict between the Owners and the 
Players in Major League Baseball,” Albany Law Review, vol. 60 (1996), 205-238, 
http://home.heinonline.org/ (accessed 21 Sep. 2011). 
18
 William B. Gould IV, “Labor Issues in Professional Sport: Reflections on Baseball, Labor, and Antitrust 
Law,” Stanford Law and Policy Review, vol. 15.1 (2004), 61-97, http://home.heinonline.org/ (accessed 21 
Sep. 2011). 
19
 Scott E. Backman, “NFL Players Fight for Their Freedom: The History of Free Agency in the NFL,” 
Sports Lawyers Journal, vol. 9 (2002), 1-55, http://home.heinonline.org/ (accessed 21 Sep. 2011).  
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motivation for the players unions from the 1970s to the modern day. This paper will 
outline the unions’ shifts in focus from procuring free agency in the 1970s and 1980s to 
their modern goals of ensuring financial equality with the owners and guaranteeing 
pensions, safety standards and other rights for their members.  
Chapters in this paper will alternate between baseball and football, outlining and 
comparing their respective struggles during each period of labor negotiations. Chapter 
two will focus on Curt Flood, his lawsuit against MLB, and how it led to a system of free 
agency in baseball. Chapter three will explain how the NFLPA achieved free agency 
around the same time as MLB players did, but then negotiated that right away. They did 
not earn it back until the early 1990s. Chapter four shows the tumultuous period after the 
free agency system replaced the reserve system in MLB and how the owners attempted to 
combat that change. Chapter five outlines the state of prosperity and labor peace which 
the NFL achieved in the 1990s and early 2000s before another major work stoppage in 
2011. 
  
 
 
Chapter 2 – Flood v Kuhn 
 Curt Flood was a twelve-year veteran outfielder for the St. Louis Cardinals of the 
National League when he was traded to the Philadelphia Phillies in 1969. Because he had 
been in St. Louis for so long, Flood did not wish to play for the new team and so he 
petitioned for the right to become a free agent.1 In a letter to Bowie Kuhn, the 
Commissioner of Major League Baseball, he declared that he was “not a piece of 
property to be bought and sold irrespective of [his] wishes.”2 Free agency would have 
given him the right to take bids from any team that wanted him and choose the team for 
which he wanted to play. Commissioner Kuhn denied Flood’s petition and instructed him 
to report to the Philadelphia organization. Rather than give in, Flood chose to put his 
playing career on hold and sue the Commissioner, the presidents of the two major 
leagues, and the 24 major league teams.3 
 Flood’s motivation for suing Commissioner Kuhn and MLB was not a problem 
with going to Philadelphia or any “particular city but was the reserve clause, which 
afflicted all players equally no matter where they played.”4 Even if he managed to 
convince the Court to reverse its previous decisions and strike down the reserve system, 
Flood would not have received damages. His annual salary of $90,000 was based on 
player contracts which had been legal according to the Supreme Court for nearly half of a 
                                                 
1
 Bowie Kuhn, Hardball: The Education of a Baseball Commissioner (New York: Random House, 1987), 
83. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
4
 Curt Flood, “My Rebellion,” Sports Illustrated, 1 February 1971, 
http://www.sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault (accessed 17 Apr. 2012). 
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century. No court would find him in need of financial support. Additionally, the case 
would take several years to reach the Supreme Court and the baseball owners would not 
be likely to sign him to play during that time. Flood’s loss in salary would approach 
$300,000. The owners would also have been unlikely to sign Flood as a manager or 
scout, both careers that he had been considering after his playing days were over. By 
pursuing this case, Flood was effectively ending his career in professional baseball in 
every capacity.5  
 Well aware of the sacrifices which he was undertaking, Flood’s motivation was to 
benefit the other players as well as those yet to come into the league. Flood felt the 
owners treated the players like “used cars.”6 The reserve system was only one aspect of 
the poor treatment. Players were forced to play when sick or injured. If they did not do 
so, they were accused of faking injuries, or “jaking,” in order to get more rest.7 Jakers 
were portrayed negatively in the press and were seen as a bad influence on a team. Many 
players were traded because of reputations as troublemakers. These players were often 
playing through serious injuries and illnesses which teams refused to acknowledge or 
treat and could have led to worse health problems for the players.8  
 Poor treatment extended beyond just the players but also to who was allowed to 
be a player. Until Jackie Robinson’s debut in 1946, black players had only been allowed 
to participate in the Negro Leagues, which were underfunded and unstable, but provided 
                                                 
5
 Brad Snyder, A Well-Paid Slave: Curt Flood’s Fight for Free Agency in Professional Sports (New York: 
Penguin, 2007), 24-25. 
6
 Flood, “My Rebellion.” 
7
 Curt Flood, The Way It Is (New York: Pocket Books, 1972), 66. 
8
 Ibid.  
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black players a way to play professional ball.9 When Flood, who was black, was breaking 
into professional baseball a decade after Robinson had broken the color barrier, MLB had 
become far more integrated. However, the fans in many towns, especially those in the 
South where spring training was held, were less willing to accept black baseball players. 
The Supreme Court’s decision to integrate public schools and public buses had infuriated 
many people. Flood and other black players experienced the full extent of that hatred 
from fans during ballgames.10 
 It was to end these injustices that Flood brought suit against Commissioner Kuhn 
and Major League Baseball. The ensuing case, Flood v. Kuhn, reached the Supreme 
Court of the United States in 1972. Flood argued that the reserve clause in baseball 
represented a violation of US antitrust laws and civil rights statutes and a form of 
involuntary servitude which conflicted with the 13th Amendment.11 The decision of the 
Court came down 5-3 in favor of Major League Baseball, preserving the status quo.  
Contracts which were restrictive in precisely the manner which Justice Douglas 
described had become common practice in professional baseball. In fact, every contract 
that a player signed with a team included a clause which said that the team had the right 
to renew the contract for another year at as low as 80 percent of the previous year’s 
salary.12 Because the renewed contract contained the same provision for renewal, the club 
in effect owned the player for as long as it chose to keep him. The only way for a player 
to change teams was if his contract were sold or traded to another team. Even if the 
                                                 
9
 William C. Rhoden, Forty Million Dollar Slaves: The Rise, Fall, and Redemption of the Black Athlete 
(New York: Three Rivers Press, 2006), 102. 
10
 Snyder A Well-Paid Slave, 44. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Ibid, 2. 
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player stopped playing baseball, the team could keep the contract in order to prevent him 
from joining another team at a later date. The only restriction on the reserve clause was 
the number of players which could be reserved. In 1879, when the system originated, the 
limit was set at five players. By 1969, the limit had reached 40.13 
Challenges to the reserve clause did not begin with Curt Flood. In 1890, Congress 
enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act which made illegal any contract which inhibited 
interstate trade. In 1922, the court handed down the decision for Federal Baseball Club of 
Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, which declared that 
baseball was not interstate commerce and therefore not protected by the Sherman Act.14 
Because each game was played within one state there was no interstate commerce 
occurring despite the fact that players crossed state lines in order to play. 1953 saw the 
next major case involving the monopoly status of baseball in Toolson v. New York 
Yankees. This case was combined with two other similar cases and presented to the 
Supreme Court. The plaintiffs argued that the expansion of television and radio 
broadcasts had clearly caused the sport to grow into a form of interstate commerce and 
therefore make it subject to the Sherman Act. The Court maintained its previous position 
and reaffirmed the decision from the Federal Baseball case, and even expanded the 
reasoning for baseball’s monopoly.15  
When Curt Flood decided to take the reserve clause back to court, he had to do 
more than just prove his own case. First he had to overcome the precedent from two 
major Supreme Court decisions and stare decisis, or the idea that the court was obligated 
                                                 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Ibid, 20. 
15
 Ibid, 22-23. 
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to respect an established precedent. Then he could actually present his own argument for 
why the reserve clause was illegal.16 One of the keys to separating himself from the 
previous cases was establishing the differences between himself and the previous 
plaintiffs.  
In Federal Baseball, the party seeking to end the reserve clause was a team 
arguing that the reserve clause was preventing it from participating effectively in the 
league. In Toolson, the party was a minor-league player who had little influence in the 
game of baseball. The difference between these two parties and Curt Flood was that 
Flood was an established major-league player. He had won three World Series in St. 
Louis during a five year span and had received many personal awards as well. He was a 
team co-captain, three-time All-Star and seven-time winner of the Gold Glove award for 
the best defensive player at his position.17 He was a prominent member of a fun and 
successful clubhouse.18  
Flood was therefore attacking the reserve clause from a new angle. As a player, he 
had more individual rights than a team, which was the plaintiff in Federal Baseball. A 
team had more power to go find new players and work around the reserve clause, 
therefore the clause was less monopolistic. Players had less of that power. They were 
forced into the reserve system and had no way out. The difference between Flood and the 
players in Toolson was Flood’s popularity. While this popularity may not have 
established more legal right inside of a courthouse, it did create more of a public 
spectacle which brought more attention to the issue. Part of the controversy surrounding 
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 Ibid, 23. 
17
 Ibid, 1. 
18
 Curt Flood, The Way It Is, 68. 
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the case was sparked by Flood’s reaction to a question he received while appearing on 
ABC’s A Wild World of Sports. When asked what was so hard about being traded when 
he was making $90,000 per year, Flood answered “A well-paid slave is nonetheless a 
slave.”19 Flood’s concern was not that he was underpaid, but that he was being stripped 
of his humanity and treated like livestock.  
Other athletes in other sports harbored similar feelings. Muhammad Ali declared 
in May of 1970 that he was done fighting because he saw it as a competition between two 
owners over whose slave could win the fight. The feeling that owners stripped the 
athletes of their humanity was not limited to just black athletes. In the same month that 
Ali made his comments, Chip Oliver and Dave Meggyesy, both white football players, 
retired from the NFL because of the “dehumanizing” effect that it had on players.20  
The majority opinion was written by Justice Blackmun who declared that Major 
League Baseball was a business which engaged in interstate commerce which would 
normally mean that federal antitrust laws would apply. However, the reserve system 
enjoyed by the Major League owners was an exception which was unique to baseball. 
The uniqueness of the reserve clause had been preserved through multiple Supreme Court 
cases. Were the clause to be struck down, it would occur in Congress, not in the Court.21  
In his concurrence, Chief Justice Burger said that he had reservations as to the 
correctness of the cases used as precedence for this case. However, he agreed that the 
proper place for the issue to be decided was in Congress and not in the courts.22  
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 Curt Flood, Quoted in Brad Snyder, A Well-Paid Slave, 103-4. 
20
 Snyder, A Well-Paid Slave, 103-5. 
21
 Flood v. Kuhn. 
22
 Ibid, (Burger concurring opinion). 
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 In his dissent, Justice Douglas argued that the owners did not have the right to 
claim the players as equities, because those equities were in fact people who had rights. 
Justice Douglas referred to the players as victims in the sense of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act in order to establish that their rights were being violated by the owners. “A contract 
which forbids anyone to practice his calling is commonly called an unreasonable restraint 
of trade.”23 Justice Douglas also argued that the Court’s decision in previous cases 
regarding the reserve clause was “a derelict in the stream of the law that we, its creator, 
should remove.”24 
 The decision occurred during the unrest of the Civil Rights movement and at the 
same time as the Vietnam War. The nation was also facing high unemployment; in 
December of 1964, President Johnson said “the number one priority today is more jobs. 
That is our dominant domestic problem and we have to face it head-on.”25 While there 
were protests in the streets of the segregated South, soldiers dying in Vietnam, and 
everyday Americans were looking for work, Curt Flood wanted to turn down $100,000 to 
feel like he was not just a piece of property.26  
 Flood was a well-known player who had a positive reputation among baseball 
players. This reputation helped him gain the support of the Major League Baseball 
Players Association. That support gave his case a much greater financial backing than if 
Flood had chosen to proceed on his own. The resources of the Players Association did not 
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just include money. The lawyers and other legal personnel employed by the Association 
would prove to be beneficial as well.27  
 The deck was stacked against the players in Flood’s eyes through the use of media 
and public perception. Harry Caray was the play-by-play broadcaster on radio and 
television for the Cardinals while Flood played for them. Caray seemed to players to have 
great enthusiasm for the St. Louis organization and its successes as a whole, while being 
critical of any player’s individual performance. As the voice of the team, Caray’s 
descriptions of players had an impact on public opinion. That opinion was very important 
to players when they were negotiating their new contracts. Popular players were usually 
given significant pay raises, while other players could see their pay stagnate or even 
diminish.28 
 Flood claimed that players were well aware of the importance of the fans’ 
affections in determining their salary, and of their own difficulty in negotiating with 
ownership. They also felt that the owners’ powerful negotiating position was unfounded. 
They felt that because the fans came to see them play, they were the true generators of 
income. If there were no players, then there would be no way for the owners to sell 
tickets, food or merchandise. Therefore, in their own eyes, the players should have had 
more freedom and more ability to earn the money which they themselves were 
generating.29  
 To the players, a particularly bothersome aspect of the reserve clause was that it 
allowed the team to reduce their salary by as much as 20 percent each year. Generally, 
                                                 
27
 Snyder, A Well-Paid Slave, 24. 
28
 Ibid, 73-74. 
29
 Ibid, 109-110. 
20 
 
 
 
the players’ salaries would increase slowly over time as the player developed and 
improved. However, if there was a drop-off in production, then the player could expect a 
substantial decrease in his salary for the next season. Teams could also use new players 
as leverage to force veterans to sign for less money. If a veteran wanted too much money, 
there was always a young prospect willing to take his place on the roster for a fraction of 
the cost. The reserve system depressed athlete salaries compared to other entertainment 
industries which used a more open market as a means of labor acquisition.30  
The supporters of the reserve system offered three strong arguments for its 
continuation. First, they argued that players were well paid compared to typical 
Americans and could not complain about their situation. They pointed to the fact that the 
average salary of a baseball player in 1970 was $28,000 in a time when over 80 percent 
of American families were making less than $15,000 per year.31 Second, they argued that 
the structure of the reserve system ensured equality and fairness between the teams. In an 
open market system, the wealthiest teams would all buy the best players and would then 
be able to win the most games each year. This would ruin the competitiveness of the 
game and be worse for the owners, players and fans.32 A less competitive game would be 
less interesting and therefore draw less fan attention, leading to lower income for owners 
and lower salaries for players, they argued. Thirdly, the owners also argued that the 
reserve clause protected them from financial ruin. A free market system would allow 
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salaries to escalate too rapidly for them to handle, causing them to go out of business and 
ending the entire league.33  
Baseball owners had established and fought for the reserve clause because it was 
for the good of the game.34 When the clause was first enacted, it was common practice 
for a player to leave one team in the middle of a season in order to seek a higher salary 
from another team. As teams began pilfering each others’ rosters, the fans began to lose 
interest in both players and owners. Owners agreed to each reserve a set number of 
players whom the other teams would not be able to sign for the next season. Ford Frick, 
the Commissioner of MLB until 1965, argued that the plan worked and the rosters of the 
various teams stabilized without impeding the increases in salary which many players had 
feared.35  
Frick further argued that the reserve clause had been in place for nearly a century, 
had seen the growth of the game into national prominence and had become the very 
backbone of the game.36 While Major League Baseball had risen to tremendous success 
under the reserve clause, it needed tweaks throughout the years. Rules such as the draft 
and waiver rules protected players by spreading the talent of incoming players among all 
of the teams and preventing teams with particularly deep talent pools from holding 
talented players in the minor leagues when they were able to play at the highest level of 
competition.37 
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In 1967, the MLBPA and MLB established an agreement which structured 
contracts for players. Part of that agreement included the reserve clause in every contract. 
Kuhn argued that if they had wanted to remove the reserve clause, the players ought to 
have negotiated for it at that time. He also saw the attempt at litigation as “the union 
trying to take two bites of the apple.”38 He felt that Miller was unwilling to try to 
negotiate the clause away because doing so would likely have involved a players strike, 
and he doubted that the players would have been able to strike for long enough to enact 
major change. Kuhn saw Flood’s lawsuit as a second tactic to enact that change, through 
litigation rather than negotiation.39  
 To the owners’ first point, Flood had two rebuttals. He first pointed out that the 
best baseball players were paid at a substantially higher rate than typical players and this 
disparity distorted the average salary. He argued, based on numbers from the Players 
Association, that the majority of players were paid less than $20,000 per year, and nearly 
one in five were paid the league minimum of $10,000.40 While an annual salary of 
$10,000 was still around the 60th percentile of household incomes for 1970, it made the 
average income of baseball players seem far less outlandish compared to the average 
person.41  
His second counterpoint to the idea that ball-players were overpaid was to 
consider their income in comparison to the income of the industry as a whole and then 
view that in light of what other industries paid their workers. Flood cited the MLBPA in 
saying that the salary of all baseball players in 1969 totaled $20 million plus $5.5 million 
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paid into the players’ benefit plan, but that the estimated income of baseball’s revenue 
from all sources to be approximately $150 million.42 When including the salary paid to 
minor-league players, Flood estimated that about 20 percent of baseball’s income was 
paid to its players. To give perspective, Flood offered the rates of other industries. In 
manufacturing, about 24 percent of income was paid to workers with some companies, 
such as U.S. Steel, paying as high as 40 percent. Some entertainment industries paid their 
performers above 50 percent of the industry income. Additionally, in 1929 the players 
were paid 35 percent of the operating income, meaning that the players’ share of the 
revenue had been declining over the 40 years prior to his case.43 
Flood acted on behalf of all baseball players in his decision to reject his trade to 
Philadelphia and stand against the reserve system. He was trying to remove the limits that 
they had on their salaries as well as on the restrictions on their movement among teams. 
While he saw himself as fighting for the rights of the players, many saw him as a trouble-
maker who was simply looking to increase the benefits of a wealthy group of people who 
were paid to play a game.44  
Interestingly, Kuhn felt that Flood’s case hurt the relationship between the players 
and owners enough that it weakened the negotiating power of the union with respect to 
the reserve clause. Some executives had been open to negotiating for some sort of free 
agency and while they were outnumbered by those who supported the reserve system, 
their number would likely have grown as newer and younger executives were brought 
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into the industry. 45 However, after the Flood case, the relationship between owners and 
players was even more strained and the owners were less willing to negotiate any form of 
free agency into the reserve system.46 
After the decision was handed down in Flood, Kuhn saw change in the air. He did 
not claim the decision as a victory for baseball, but declared that collective bargaining 
would be the most effective way to negotiate change in the reserve system, whatever 
change that might be. It was unlikely that he saw the change happening in the manner in 
which it did.  
At the beginning of the 1975 season nine players were competing without having 
signed contracts for the new season, meaning that they were playing on the renewal 
option of their 1974 contracts. While most of them ended up signing new contracts 
during that season, Andy Messersmith of the Los Angeles Dodgers completed the season 
under his 1974 contract. He was then entered in a free agency grievance by the Players 
Association.47 The grievance would enter arbitration which would find in favor of 
Messersmith and the Players Association. The owners and players would have to begin a 
new labor negotiation which Bowie Kuhn declared as “the most important labor 
negotiation ever.”48 Out of that bargaining, free agency would emerge.  
While Flood v. Kuhn may not have taken down the reserve clause on its own, it 
was a key factor in the eventual introduction of free agency to Major League Baseball. 
The language of the decision suggested that, while the Court would not strike it down on 
its own, the reserve clause was certainly assailable. This helped motivate the Players 
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Association to keep searching for a means of striking down the reserve system and 
eventually did lead to its demise and the advent of free agency. Flood’s actions were an 
important step on the path for the union leading from being seen as property to partners. 
  
 
Chapter 3 – Scabs and Picket Lines 
In 1975 the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) was able to 
accomplish what Curt Flood and the MLBPA had been unable to do a few years earlier: 
gain the right to free agency through the courts. Prior to 1975, the Rozelle Rule had 
declared that any team which signed a player from another team was to compensate the 
other team with players, draft picks or money. This rule stifled player movement between 
teams. From 1963 to 1975, only four players signed as free agents with new teams.1 In 
Mackey v. NFL (1976), the 8th Circuit ruled that the Rozelle Rule was an unreasonable 
restraint of trade and fell within what was prohibited by the Sherman Antitrust Act of 
1890 because the rule deterred player movement within the league.2  
After this decision, players could negotiate with new teams after playing out their 
contracts and did not need to be concerned with the problems of compensation between 
teams. Yet in 1977, the NFLPA bargained away this newly earned right in favor of a 
different method of determining compensation for free agent signings. The new 
Collective Bargaining Agreement gave players the ability to remove the option clause 
from their contract, but at the cost of a reduction in salary, and gave owners the ability to 
match any offer made to one of their players by another team. This system allowed a 
player to escape the option year, essentially the same as the reserve clause in a MLB 
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contract, but at the risk of a reduced salary. Under this new system only one player signed 
on to play with a new team. Players were willing to give up the right to free agency in 
1977 in favor of an increased pension and other benefits which were better for all players 
as opposed to the elite and popular alone. The majority of the players felt that free agency 
was less beneficial to them compared to athletes in other sports and the NFLPA acted on 
behalf of that majority.3  
While free agency would have given NFL players more freedom to move about 
the league as they pleased, it was projected to be less effective at increasing player 
salaries in football than in baseball for three reasons: First, signing one player, even a 
star, had less of an impact on the success of a NFL team than it did in other sports. 
Football is the only major sport in which players do not play both offense and defense. 
There is also a greater reliance upon the other players on a team in football than in other 
sports. 4 In baseball, if a player is capable of hitting a lot of home runs in a season, then 
he is likely to do so regardless of the quality of his team. In basketball, a player who can 
shoot the ball very well will still be able to shoot regardless of the abilities of his 
teammates. However, in football a quarterback cannot complete passes unless the 
offensive line protects him, the receivers run the play properly and catch the ball and the 
defense keeps the other team’s offense off of the field. No matter the skills of one player, 
the game is ultimately won by the better team – more so than in other sports. 
An additional confounding factor restricting player movement is the strategy and 
scheming involved in football. A player who was very successful for one team may have 
limited success for another simply because of how his abilities matched up with what the 
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coaches expected him to do. While in baseball, for the most part, a power-hitter is a 
power-hitter and a shortstop is a shortstop, in football there is a lot more variability in 
what each position may need. Because each team has a different scheme that has specific 
needs which may differ from other teams, there would logically be less overall demand 
for a player around the league because he may not fit into every scheme. 
The NFLPA felt that the only players who would receive even a marginal benefit 
from free agency would have been the elite players at marquee positions like quarterback 
and wide receiver. While these super stars would garner more attention from the teams, 
the average players or those who played an unremarkable position, such as offensive line 
or kicker, would continue along with similar salaries.5  
Second, NFL teams also were set to profit less from signing a better player 
because almost all games sold about 95 percent of their tickets, meaning that there was 
little room to increase revenue on game-day, regardless of their won-loss record.6 While a 
baseball team might have seen a dramatic increase in attendance to watch a new player, 
NFL teams were already tremendously popular and there would be little evidence of the 
player’s impact on ticket sales. The NFL also had far fewer games than Major League 
Baseball, meaning that there were far fewer opportunities for a new player to have 
whatever impact on attendance that he may have had. While baseball teams had close to 
100 home games every year to sell tickets, NFL teams had less than 10.  
The NFL further decreased the competition for elite players by engaging in 
revenue sharing. All NFL clubs earned approximately the same amount of money 
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regardless of their on-field performance. This sharing of revenue included TV contracts 
and ticket revenue, the two largest forms of income for the league.7 If a team stood to 
gain very little by signing a player from another team, there was little incentive to add 
that player’s increased salary to the payroll. While MLB owners spent millions of dollars 
on free agents in the decade after their inception of free agency in 1976, the NFL owners 
were unlikely to engage as aggressively in the bidding for top talent.8 
Finally, because of the physicality of the game, injuries were more prevalent in 
the NFL than in other sports and therefore the average playing career of a football player 
was shorter than that of a baseball or basketball player. This shorter duration afforded 
players fewer opportunities to take advantage of the already limited benefits of free 
agency. Star players who were destined to have long careers may have benefited from the 
ability to sell their talents to the highest bidder, but the average players who made up 
most of the league were more concerned with an improved pension plan.9 
 For these reasons, the NFLPA gave up the right to have free agency in 1977. In 
1982, as they negotiated with the owners on a new CBA, they once again fought the idea 
of free agency and instead demanded a specific share of the NFL teams’ total revenues, 
namely 55 percent, and then pay players based on a formula which ignored position and 
focused on years in the league and performances such as Pro Bowl appearances. The 
owners did not like the idea of the formula and instead favored negotiations with each 
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individual player.10 The NFLPA argued that the revenue sharing among the owners 
offered no incentive for teams to pay better players more money. They thought that 
owners could actually save money by replacing expensive veteran players with less 
skilled but cheaper rookies and that there was actually an incentive for the owners to 
lose.11 If owners cut or traded all expensive players and replaced them with cheap, less 
talented players, then they would likely not play as well because their team would be less 
talented. However, they would still make money because of the structure of the NFL’s 
revenue sharing system which protected struggling teams.12 
Ed Garvey, the executive director of the NFLPA, pointed out that the NFL had 
paid 67.7 percent of its revenue to player salaries in 1967 while the AFL had competed 
for the top players. In 1982, he claimed that the players’ share had fallen to between 26 
percent and 30 percent, although the owners claimed that it was 44 percent.13 
Additionally, pro football players were paid an average of $78,000 per year in 1980 when 
the average NBA salary was $186,000 and baseball players averaged $143,000.14 Garvey 
argued that the only way for NFL players to get their fair share was to be guaranteed a 
share of the revenue which would then be divvied up among the players based on years in 
the league, as well as performance incentives.15  
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These figures were at a time when the average American household was making 
slightly more than $21,000 annually.16 A recession in the early 1980s had caused a 
reduction of wages in union contracts by between seven and eight-and-a-half percent, and 
forced unions to concede on issues like two-tiered wage systems and reduction in 
vacation days, retirement and medical benefits. There was also concern among unions 
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had damaged the leverage of unions. When the Act 
guaranteed legal protection for women and minorities, it allowed gave them more 
leverage as individuals and they therefore were less dependent on unions for protection.17 
Garvey wanted to create a wage scale which would pay each player the same base 
salary, regardless of position, based on the number of years in the league. Using the 
figures from 1980, Garvey projected an increase in salary of about $24,000 for first year 
players, $37,000 for third year players, and $52,000 for players in their fifth year.18 The 
difference would continue to grow as players spent more time in the league. However, 
owners feared that paying each player the same wage would not create enough incentive 
for the players to create the most competitive, entertaining, and therefore, profitable 
product on the field. To remedy this, Garvey included performance bonuses in his plan. 
These bonuses ranged from a $1,750 for every game started and a proportional scale 
based on playing time to a $50,000 payday for making the Pro Bowl.19 There would also 
be a large sum of money to be given to the players whose teams make the playoffs each 
year. Garvey argued that his plan would have paid any player on the Super Bowl-
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champion San Francisco 49ers more than $195,000, in addition to their base salary in 
1982.20  
The owners rejected the Union’s offer of a shared revenue system, not because 
they felt that 55 percent was too high, but because they did not wish to share a specific 
percentage of football revenue, be it 55 percent or five percent.21 John Donlan, the 
executive director of the owners’ Management Council, said “You really equate a 
percentage with control, and when you get a percentage of anything you want to change 
things. The owners are not going to let the Union run their business.”22 They also rejected 
the deal because they saw the salary scale as a minimum, not a standard. Donlan argued 
that there was nothing to prevent a player from holding out for more money.23 
The wage scale was an issue for the owners for the precise reason that Garvey 
preferred it: the scale would raise the salaries of the average players while doing little to 
benefit the best players. He felt that the best players were already well compensated and 
would continue to be in a new system because they would reach many of the performance 
incentives within the proposed pay system. Donlan explained that “the wage scale 
destroys incentive. You end up overpaying people on your own team… It would increase 
the salaries of the marginal players, and it doesn’t reward the guys who are genuine 
contributors.”24 Art Rooney told one of his employees “… It doesn’t matter what you pay 
Lambert…Swann, Franco, Bradshaw, Webster, or Ham. You can never overpay the good 
athletes. Where you get in trouble in this business is when you pay the guys who can’t 
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play.”25 The owners were clearly willing to give more money to the players who they felt 
deserved more; they were just unwilling to pay more money to the average players.  
The NFLPA backed down from their demand of a 55 percent share of all revenue 
and instead asked for half of the television revenues over four years, a sum totaling $1.6 
billion. They still wanted the system to be set up with a scale based on years in the league 
with incentives for Pro Bowl selections, player voting for top performers, and other 
individual and team-based bonuses. The owners were willing to accept this deal with only 
two changes: they wanted to pay the $1.6 billion total over five years instead of four, and 
they wanted to negotiate each individual player’s salary with that player. If after 5 years 
some of the $1.6 billion remained, then the owners would give to the players what was 
left to divide amongst themselves. The players however, stuck to their guns. They wanted 
to have a wage scale and were willing to fight for it.26  
The establishment of a new rival, the United States Football League, or USFL, 
was an additional concern for the owners. The new league was set to begin with several 
advantages. For one, it had a television agreement, and therefore guaranteed revenue, in 
place. David Dixon, the founder of the USFL, was also very careful with who he allowed 
to be owners. Each new franchise had to have the financial support and ability to sustain 
itself for three seasons before it was allowed into the league. The timing of the league 
was lucky as well because the labor struggles in the NFL provided for the potential 
poaching of the established league’s players.27  
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Interestingly enough, the USFL did not wish to steal the best players from the 
NFL. Dixon and his new league hoped to develop superstars of their own. The cost of 
signing veteran players from the NFL was simply too high and too risky for the young 
league. They did, however, attempt to draft the same elite college prospects.28 They also 
searched the NFL’s ranks in order to fill their coaching staffs and in many ways that was 
just as offensive to the NFL owners as any attempts to steal players. Art Rooney, the 
owner of the Pittsburgh Steelers and one of the original NFL owners, was upset by the 
defection of coaches to the USFL and the conflicts of interest which often arose among 
the owners of the two leagues.29 
On September 20th, the NFLPA went on strike after two weeks of regular-season 
play. It was the first time in the history of the league that there was a work stoppage 
during the season.30 The players believed that it would take three weeks for the owners to 
feel the economic pinch enough to accept the Union demands. The strike would last for 
57 days, ending in mid-November, and resulted in a very strange season. The agreement 
between the players and the owners was that the league would continue under very 
similar rules to the previous CBA for the next five years. Effectively, the players had 
gained very little. What they had gained, however, was the respect of the ownership for 
proving that they could sustain a strike as well as compromise on some basic issues over 
which they had struck. The players got their wage scale, severance pay and the right to 
reject any agents who they saw as unfit. However, they still commanded the lowest 
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average salaries in professional sports and did not get any central fund or a pay structure 
based on the revenues of the league.31 
The owners were able to so effectively endure the strike because they had planned 
ahead and taken provisions against such an event. In their contract with the major 
television networks ABC, NBC and CBS, the NFL owners had included a clause that the 
networks would advance the league $30 million in the first two weeks of any strike. 
While the money would eventually have to be paid back, it was effectively and interest-
free loan of slightly more than $1 million per team. This loan along with the fact that the 
owners did not have to pay the salaries of the players during the strike was enough to 
offset, at least temporarily, the owners’ lost revenue.32 
Financially, the owners had every advantage. The loan from the television 
networks was only part of their financial-security. Season-ticket owners had also paid for 
their tickets and the owners had not been required to pay that money back yet. On the 
other hand, the players did not have any financial parachute. By November, when the 
owners put an offer on the table, the teams began to vote for its acceptance almost 
immediately. While the NFLPA was able to negotiate some more minor benefits into the 
agreement, they were largely forced to agree to what the owners put in front of them. 
Their hopes for a better deal would have to be put off until 1987.33 
In 1987, five years after a strike that lasted nearly two months, the players and 
owners were facing another major labor battle with the expiration of the latest CBA. 
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Many of the issues which were at issue previously remained – including free agency, 
pensions, severance pay. The television deal between the owners and the networks was 
also paying each owner $17 million per year and the players wanted their share of that 
money.34 There was speculation that the players were less organized than they had been a 
half decade earlier and would therefore be less willing to strike. The fact that they had 
never won a major battle with the owners except through the courts was another concern 
for the players.35 However, after only one player had been able to change teams in the 
past ten years, the players came to the negotiating table claiming that they were willing to 
sit out the entire 1987 season if the owners did not allow unrestricted free-agency. On 
September 22, 1987, the players once again struck.36 
Once again, the owners were much better prepared than the players to endure the 
time in between paychecks. The Union had not learned its lesson from five years earlier 
and did not form a strike fund or seek a line of credit through which players would have 
been able to take out loans. The NFLPA was able to establish more credibility with local 
unions and garner more fan support against the owners, yet this did not help to alleviate 
the income which the players were missing by striking.37 Fans’ support for players was 
particularly weak in cities which lacked a strong union presence.38 During the strike, the 
players lost about $15,000 per player per game; adding up to nearly $80 million in lost 
income altogether.39  
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Rather than simply wait out the players, as they had done in 1982, the owners 
tried a much more aggressive strategy: they hired replacement players. Every NFL season 
began with a training camp in which nearly 100 players would show up to try out for 
each team. This group of players would be whittled down to the final roster, which had a 
maximum number of players established by the league. Because the players’ strike began 
early in the season, not long after training camp, every team had a list of young men who 
were willing to play during the strike. The team simply offered each of these players a 
small amount of money to stand by as potential replacements in case of a strike. When 
the strike came, the owners had a cheap way to maintain their revenue.40 
The games played by replacement players, dubbed “scab ball” by the striking 
NFL players, drew fewer fans both to the games and through television viewership.41 
Television views started close to the same level as for regular football, but fell as the 
strike wore on. Ticket sales, however, started very poorly but rose from the first week of 
the strike to the later weeks. Even though there was less revenue from ticket sales and 
television, the owners actually made more money during the strike because of the 
tremendously lower prices commanded by the scab players. The average owner’s profit 
increased by nearly $121,000 per game.42  
The replacement games were not only an attempt by the owners to keep making 
money during the strike; they were a legal tactic as well. Tex Schramm, the president of 
the Dallas Cowboys said that the teams had “a contractual relationship with [their] 
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players, and [they had] to be ready to honor it.”43 Not honoring that agreement may have 
voided the players’ contracts. Without teams for which they could play, the players may 
have been able to argue that they were already free agents, precisely what the owners 
were trying to avoid during the negotiations in the first place.44  
Further adding to the owners’ advantage was the temptation which the scab games 
created among the players. A player who was keenly feeling the hardship of the lack of 
income need only cross the picket line to join the “scabs” and he could continue playing 
under his previous contract. Additionally, any player who had no issue with his present 
contract or who felt that the NFLPA was wrong could cross as well. Many players did. 
From average players to superstars, nearly 15 percent of the players crossed the picket 
lines.45 On October 15, the players strike ended, only 24 days after it began.46  
The players who crossed the lines weakened the bargaining position of the union 
as a whole and in many ways led to the rapid end of the strike. Without unity, the NFLPA 
crumbled. Those who did not cross were very upset with those who did. Atlanta Falcons’ 
Linebacker Tim Green was the only regular player on the team who played in every scab 
game. When he was asked about his teammates returning to work, he said “I will be 
ostracized. A lot of guys have so much anger and frustration over the strike. Of course, 
they'll take it out on me.”47  
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Unlike in 1982, when the NFLPA had at least gained respect for maintaining a 
long-term strike, 1987 was a complete loss for the players.48 The union had claimed that 
free agency was their biggest issue. Yet many players were unconcerned with free 
agency.49 Regardless of the opinions held by many of the players regarding free agency, 
the owners completely rejected it – even after the players backed down from unlimited 
free agency to a system which began after a player had been in the league for four years. 
Owners felt that free agency would “destroy a system that [had] brought prosperity to the 
players and owners alike.”50 The players were no closer to attaining free agency than they 
had been a month earlier.51  
In addition to free agency, the players had wanted guaranteed contracts for all 
players with two or more years in the league. The owners were willing to guarantee the 
contracts for only those players who had four years of experience. The players also 
wanted the NFL to create a pension fund for the players and contribute $25 million 
annually. Owners were willing to contribute half of that amount. The players were 
fighting for a scale of minimum salaries as well, ranging from $90,000 for a rookie to 
$320,000 for a player in his 13th year. The NFL was willing to set the minimums at 
$60,000 and $180,000 for those same levels of experience.52 
The players achieved none of their goals during the strike. There was much 
speculation at the time that the players had been beaten so badly in the boardroom that 
even their on-field performance was suffering, and the players often admitted the same 
                                                 
48
 Staudohar, “The Football Strike of 1987,” 31. 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 Zimmerman, “When Push Came to Shove.” 
51
 Backman, “NFL Players Fight for Their Freedom,” 20. 
52
 Staudohar, “The Football Strike of 1987,” 27 – Table. 
40 
 
 
 
feeling. Rocky Klever, a player for the New York Jets, was asked about the strike taking 
away some emotion and he replied “Yeah, at least emotion toward liking football. That 
might be the reason why guys haven’t played with emotion.”53 
Because of their failure to achieve free agency through negotiation, the NFLPA 
filed a lawsuit on the day that the strike ended. This lawsuit was the beginning of a series 
of lawsuits, Powell v. NFL I, II, & III as well as McNeil v. NFL, which would slowly chip 
away at the NFL and its labor antitrust exemptions. Powell I & II set the stage for a case 
to determine if the owners were violating antitrust laws. In Powell III, the Eighth Circuit 
offered no guidance for settling the dispute other than the means which the Union had 
already exhausted.54  
After the Powell decisions, the owners offered two different free agency options 
to the Union. One was little more than a few minor reductions in the already existing 
restrictions on player movement. The other diminished player benefits but gave free 
agency to a limited number of free agents on each team that the team chose not to retain. 
The Union rejected both plans, with president of the NFLPA Gene Upshaw saying 
“[m]anagement’s proposal A and proposal B are really proposal bad and proposal worse 
for the players.”55 However, the NFL began to use the second plan despite the objections 
of the Union.  
The new free agency system did allow for more player movement between teams, 
with 229 players changing teams that offseason. However, most of those players were 
older, over-priced players, recovering from injuries, or only average in talent. The best 
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players were still locked to their teams with no means of moving about the league. 
Despite the limited quality of the players who were capable of moving, the average 
salaries did substantially increase. The players pointed to this as evidence that the system 
was still repressing the salaries of the best players.56  
In an effort to protect itself from the nonstatutory labor exemption and gain the 
protection of antitrust laws, the NFLPA gave up all collective bargaining rights. By 
forming a union, the players negotiated as a group which gave them much more leverage 
in dealing with the league, but cost them rights, such as the ability to sue over labor 
issues.57 On February 1, 1990, eight players filed a suit, McNeil v. NFL, arguing that the 
NFL’s free agency plan restricted player movement and therefore prevented competitive 
negotiation of their new contracts. The jury found the NFL’s plan to be too restrictive and 
forced the two sides back to the bargaining table. Because of the legal success, more 
players began to file suit against the NFL. In 1993, a new CBA was finalized and agreed 
upon which created a new mechanism for free agency, a league-wide salary cap and 
restricted rookie players. 58  
The labor disputes between the NFL and the NFLPA came at an interesting time 
in US history. The 1980s were in many ways a very difficult time in the United State. 
The first strike, in 1982, came very quickly after an economic recession which saw 7-8.5 
percent reductions in real wages of other labor unions and during which the national 
unemployment rate reached 10.8 percent.59 Yet the players were fighting for major 
increases in their already very high salaries. Along with the dropping wages, the early 
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‘80s saw a dramatic drop in union membership as well with nearly 3 million workers 
leaving their respective unions. Yet the economic recovery in the mid 80’s did not do 
anything to revive the number of union members.60 It was interesting that the NFL 
players stayed with their union so strongly during the 1982 strike while the rest of the 
labor force was abandoning organized labor.  
Furthering the bizarre disconnect between the football negotiations and the rest of 
the population was the fact that many of the major figures involved in the NFL-NFLPA 
disputes had also been major players in other labor negotiations. Jack Donlan, the 
executive director of the Management Council for the owners, worked in industrial 
relations for nearly a decade for National Airlines. While he was there, he worked on 
more than 40 contracts with eight unions and experienced four strikes, and was known as 
a tough negotiator.61 Not surprisingly, Donlan did a good job of upholding the NFL 
owners’ wishes during his time as executive director.  
Ed Garvey, on the other hand, had spent little time involved in unions beyond the 
NFLPA.62 He was seen as a selfish negotiator, more concerned with his personal 
reputation and accolades and therefore had limited support from the players. Ahmad 
Rashad, a Pro Bowl wide receiver and team captain for the Minnesota Vikings, said “like 
a lot of guys I'm pretty pro-union anyway; I'm just not very pro-Garvey.”63 Needless to 
say, he was not an overly popular figure among the NFLPA members after the 1982 
strike. He did, however, have some members of his staff who had worked in other unions 
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and experienced labor upheaval at a more grounded level. Chip Yablonski was an 
NFLPA labor counsel who had led reform of the United Mine Workers in 1969.64 
While the rest of the country was fighting for their livelihood in many ways 
through economic downturns, the NFL players were doing the same for theirs. They felt 
that they were underpaid and engaged in any means necessary to obtain fair 
compensation. The 1980s were a time that was very difficult for labor unions and the 
NFLPA experienced those troubles as well. They were able to gain very little during the 
decade. However, by constantly struggling against the power of the NFL owners, they 
were eventually able to reach an agreement which gave them the freedom that they felt 
they deserved. 
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Chapter 4 – The World Series That Wasn’t 
 After Curt Flood “sounded the alarm about players’ lack of economic freedom” 
across all sports and the subsequent striking down of the Reserve Clause in 1975, Major 
League Baseball (MLB) and the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) 
had to negotiate a new system to determine how players would be able to move between 
teams.1 Players felt that the recent decision had given them the right to move between 
team-based on their own accord, rather than just when they were told to do so. The 
owners wanted to maintain the old Reserve Clause, with some even demanding that the 
MLBPA forfeit the rights that they had just won, claiming that they had “a duty to do so” 
to protect the league and the game as a whole.2  
What would eventually become a free agency system would grant the players the 
rights and liberties that they had been seeking since the inception of the reserve clause. 
Once free agency was established, the two sides would spend the next two decades 
fighting over exactly how to set up the limits and controls on that system. Players would 
also begin to fight for issues which were less based on infringement of their rights and 
more on the fairness of the economic structure of the game. Namely the fact that they 
were underpaid when considering the amount of money that baseball generated and how 
much actually made it back to them. Because they were no longer able to be moved and 
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sold like “pieces of property,” the players were more partners with the owners than 
employees.3 Both sides had incentive to see the growth and benefit of the entire league.  
Prior to the 1976 season, the two sides spent many months in negotiation on that 
new system. During that time, the players were locked out by the owners. Spring training 
– the usual pre-season period spent evaluating talent and preparing for the upcoming 
season – was delayed by over two weeks.4 The owners originally refused to go forward 
without some sort of agreement regarding free agency and the players who would soon 
have the freedom to move about the league.5 However, the players successfully argued 
that the season should begin at the normal time because they were all under contract 
through the entire season and would not be free agents until after the season was 
completed.6  
 Players wanted only what was upheld in the Messersmith case, which was what 
had finally struck down the Reserve Clause. Namely, they wanted the ability to solicit 
offers from multiple teams after they had played out their contracts with their current 
team. They were not demanding that every player immediately become a free agent. The 
Union did not demand free agency for all players for two reasons: first, the owners would 
not have accepted that proposition, and second, because a smaller pool of free agents 
would create higher demand for those players and therefore they would receive higher 
salaries.7 Owners were unwilling to completely give in to the Messersmith decision and 
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wanted to compromise. They first submitted an offer to the players which would have 
allowed a veteran of nine Major League seasons to become a free agent when his contract 
expired. Considering that the average Major League career was only slightly above four 
years at the time, the players rejected this offer.8  
 Owners were largely concerned that the player’s ability to move freely from team 
to team would destabilize team rosters, create excessive salary inflation (making it 
difficult for teams to cover their costs) and kill competition between all of the teams. To 
further compound these problems, fans would lose interest because they would grow tired 
of watching all of their favorite players sign with teams in larger markets for more 
money. If the fans lost interest then the entire league would lose money and could 
eventually shut down. Owners favored the Reserve Clause because, in their view, it was 
created in the best interest of the game.9  
 The MLBPA largely disregarded many of these concerns. They pointed to the fact 
the fans did not lose interest when their favorite players were traded, so they would not 
lose interest because a player left via free agency. They rejected the owners concerns 
about team profitability, claiming that few of them could claim to be poor to begin with. 
The notion that they would all sign with big teams for bigger contracts was also rejected. 
Many of the players liked where they were and would not want to shop their talents 
around. Most others would not be willing to take a big contract to go play behind a better 
player with an even bigger contract. Therefore the owners were not going to see all of 
their best players follow the money to wealthy teams, like New York or Los Angeles.10 
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 Not all members of baseball’s management were so dead-set against the removal 
of the Reserve Clause. Buzzy Bavasi, the president of the team in San Diego, said “I 
think without the reserve clause baseball will be fun again. If I need a shortstop, I'll 
decide who the best shortstop is and go after him.”11 Others agreed that the Reserve 
Clause was not necessary for the prosperity of the league to continue, with some even 
calling the it “morally and legally indefensible,” as Bill Veeck, owner of the Chicago 
White Sox, had said in a 1941 letter to Judge Landis, the commissioner of baseball at the 
time.12  
These owners argued that the Reserve Clause may have been worse than free 
agency for the bottom lines of the teams. They argued that the best players would 
certainly be paid much more through free agency, but that those players were worthy of 
much higher salaries. The above average players would likely receive a slight increase as 
well. However, the majority of players who were considered average at best would likely 
gain little or even lose ground on their salaries through free agency. Bavasi argued that 
"… a lot of $25,000 journeyman players are going to go out on the free market and find 
they are worth $23,000."13 If the majority of players made less in the free agent market, 
that would have offset most or all of the cost of paying the top players more.  
After a delay of seventeen days, the Players Association finally convinced the 
owners to allow the players into spring training. While there was no agreement between 
the two sides, each had made minor concessions and the owners realized, with the help of 
the Players Association, that there were no players who would be a free agent prior to the 
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end of the season. So long as there were an agreement in place by October, there was no 
reason to delay the season, and further upset fans. Commissioner Kuhn instructed his 
owners to open their camps. Despite the delay in the opening of camps, the season was 
able to begin at the scheduled time.14  
 By the end of the 1976 season, the teams and players had come to an agreement. 
Their new system was most beneficial to veteran players because it did not create a 
completely open market among the teams for players. The new agreement did not grant 
complete free agency to any player without a contract. The reasoning for maintaining the 
ability of teams to temporarily reserve players was based on the cost of training a player 
and getting him from the amateur level through the minor leagues and to the Major 
League level, which some owners claimed was around $1.5 million per year.15 Owners 
felt, and were able to convince the players, that the investment was worth some forced 
loyalty. 
The new agreement only granted free agency to those players who had an 
expiring contract and six or more years of major league experience. However, any player 
with greater than two years of experience could have their contract submitted to 
arbitration. Generally, neither sided desired arbitration because it did not give either the 
players or the teams exactly what they wanted. Usually, players were given a higher 
salary than teams wanted to pay, but most contracts from arbitration were one-year deals 
when most players wanted long-term contracts. Any player with less than two years of 
experience was still subject to the renewal rights of their team.16  
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The new system had a wrinkle in it that prevented a completely open market for 
free agents. Players who had played out their contracts were placed into a draft pool in 
which each team indicated if they wanted to negotiate with a certain player. No more than 
twelve teams could try to sign one player. By having a draft in this fashion, many teams 
were prevented from signing players in whom they may have been interested. Once the 
draft was over, then there was complete open-market bidding for the players’ services 
among those teams which had indicated their interest through the draft.17 
Reggie Jackson was the biggest name to enter into the first free agency class. A 
talented player who could clearly help a team win games, he was also an engaging person 
who could help draw fans to the stadium. Jackson had played for two teams, Oakland and 
Baltimore, prior to his free agency and both had seen a tremendous shift in their 
attendance numbers after he left the Bay Area. In the midst of a very successful season in 
1976, Jackson addressed his coming free agency by saying “I'll soon be an overpaid 
athlete. I'll probably get a million more than I should, but I didn't make the rules. I'm just 
taking advantage of them."18 
Teams were willing to pay for the talents of a player like Jackson because of the 
increased revenue which he and others like him could generate. When he was traded from 
Oakland to Baltimore prior to the 1976 season, the attendance in Oakland dropped by 
over 300,000 people throughout the season, while Baltimore saw an increase of 67,000 
after acquiring the star.19 Jackson’s talents on the baseball diamond were certainly part of 
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his ability to attract such crowds. He was among the league leaders in home runs and runs 
batted in, or RBIs. However, his personality off the playing field made him even more of 
a fan favorite.20 
When the first group of players to reach free agency began to sign contracts with 
their new teams, it became quite apparent that the average salaries were going to explode. 
From the 1975 season to 1976, the average salary grew from $51,000 to $76,000 and 
nearly doubled that by 1980.21 Just as the owners had feared, the increased spending was 
caused by their own willingness to pay large amounts for players whom they felt would 
generate even greater revenue.22 Teams began spending more, not only on players’ 
salaries, but on the acquisition of players from other teams as well. This phenomenon led 
to teams such as the Boston Red Sox spending $1 million each to purchase Joe Rudi and 
Rollie Fingers from the Oakland Athletics. The two players’ agent, Jerry Kapstein, said 
that he would keep that price in mind when it came time for him to negotiate their next 
contracts.23 
Commissioner Kuhn blocked Oakland’s sale of these players and others because 
he felt that the Oakland owner was simply trying to liquidate his team. In his statement 
explaining the reasoning for his action, Kuhn said that “public confidence in the integrity 
of club operations and in baseball would be greatly undermined should such assignments 
not be restrained.”24 Kuhn saw the ability of the smaller market teams to simply dump all 
of their good players on the wealthier teams for cash as a disruption of competitive 
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balance. Allowing these moves would have opened the door to purchasing success by 
wealthier clubs and aroused public suspicion wholly changing the way in which players 
were developed and acquired.25 
In spite of Kuhn’s decision, teams like Boston and New York were able to spend 
exorbitant amounts of money on acquisition of veteran players. The Yankees would sign 
Reggie Jackson to a contract worth $3 million over five years after he had made $20,000 
as a rookie in 1969 and $40,000 the following year.26 Oakland, the team for which 
Jackson had played in his early career, and other small market teams were not able to 
compete with the spending of their wealthier rivals. Oakland was seen as the biggest loser 
in the new free agent system. An organization that had won three World Series in four 
years during the early 1970s with star-studded rosters was stripped of many of its best 
players.27 Baltimore was also a big loser during free agency, watching Reggie Jackson 
leave for the Yankees, Bobby Grich for the Angels, and Wayne Garland for the Indians. 
Those two franchises had won fifteen of sixteen possible division titles in the eight years 
prior to free agency. They were each projected to finish last in their divisions the first 
year after its inception. 28 
Teams with similar constraints on their ability to spend money on players were 
equally harmed by the new system. Bill Veeck, who had long opposed the Reserve 
System, was the owner of the Chicago White Sox in 1976. The team’s financial struggles 
not only eliminated their ability to attract new players to the team through free agency, 
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they actually had difficulty retaining their own players. They also turned down several 
advantageous trades which would have improved the team, but increased the team 
salary.29 
By 1980, the players and owners were once again negotiating a new Basic 
Agreement, and only agreed to one after nearly facing a midseason strike. They did, 
however, face a strike a year later which lasted 50 days and resulted in 719 missed 
games.30 The new agreement did little to change the free agency system which had been 
established four years prior and essentially only created further escalation of players’ 
salaries. From the 1980 season to 1985, the average salary went from just under $144,000 
to just over $371,000, an increase of more than 150 percent.31 As a result, in 1985 the 
owners attempted to negotiate for a salary cap as well as restrictions on the raises that 
arbitration could award to players. However, after another midseason strike for only two 
days, the owners only succeeded in increasing the minimum years of service for 
arbitration from two to three. Beyond that change, the original free agency system from 
1976 remained in place. From that point on, the battle between ownership and the 
MLBPA centered less around free agency and whether or not it should remain in place, 
and more around the fight over the growing salaries.32 
One of the reasons that the strike ended so quickly in 1985 seemed to be due to an 
agreement between the owners to limit the salaries of players through collusion rather 
than negotiation. When Detroit’s Kirk Gibson, the 1984 MVP, entered free agency that 
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offseason, he was hoping to garner a contract worth $8 million over five years. Yet not a 
single team, except for Detroit, offered him a contract at all; and their offer was for three 
years and less than $4 million.33 This lack of interest in Gibson’s talents was strange 
considering the fact that only one year earlier, the Atlanta Braves had spent $42 million 
on new players’ salaries in total. Gibson’s own team also had players who were on the 
payroll through the 1992 season due to previous contracts. Yet now they refused to offer 
their best player any contract that was longer than three years.34  
In fact, none of the free agents that year were offered more than three years. 
Gibson and other free agents were told that other teams would not talk to them until after 
the January deadline to resign with their own team had passed. Once that deadline passed, 
they would be unable to resign until after the season had started. Their current teams each 
offered them contracts worth much less than what they had expected to earn on the free 
market. Some such as Andre Dawson were forced to sign deals which were worth less 
than their previous contracts.35 Because of the lack of offers from other teams and 
because of the fear of being unemployed if the deadline passed, no “big-name free 
agents” changed teams in the offseason between 1985 and 1986. The owners considered 
this very good news. 36  
After a decade of uncontrolled spending, the owners appeared to have all 
simultaneously decided to exercise restraint and stop paying the players at continuously 
growing levels. The players were suspicious and claimed collusion in a grievance against 
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the teams. After the owners continued to attempt to prevent the movement of players 
during the 1986 and 1987 off-seasons, the players filed further complaints against the 
behavior of the owners. The three cases became known as Collusion I, II, & III. The 
players were victorious in each of these suits against the owners, at least from the long 
term perspective. In the short term, the owners were able to change their tactics slightly 
after each decision and continue suppressing the player salaries. The average salary from 
1986 ($412,520) actually decreased slightly by 1987 ($412,454). The next year, salaries 
only rose about six percent to $438,729.37 
Owners, however, argued that they had finally come to their senses and realized 
that over-spending in free agency was not an effective way to build a winning team. In 
1986, the Yankees and Braves had the highest player salaries in baseball and yet one was 
in the second-longest division title drought in baseball while the other finished dead-last 
in their division. Of the previous eight teams to win the World Series, none were major 
players in the free agent market. The owners realized that salaries had increased faster 
during the 1980s than they had during the initial five years of free agency from 1976 to 
1980 and that each team’s television revenue was projected to decrease significantly by 
1989.38 
The three Collusion decisions each declared that the owners had been “act[ing] in 
concert to eliminate the free agent market.”39 Damages were difficult to establish because 
of the varying degrees of speculation on the value of the depressed free agent and 
arbitration markets. The cases were finally settled for $280 million, which was distributed 
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to players by the Players Associations.40 Additionally, the arbitrator who decided the 
Collusion cases granted immediate free agency to seven players who had been 
particularly impacted by the unfair actions of the owners.41 Kirk Gibson was the only one 
of these players who was still young enough to command a large market value, and he 
immediately signed a larger contract with the Los Angeles Dodgers.42  
With the end of collusion, player salaries once again exploded prior to the 1990 
season. Players who were not considered particularly good, let alone superstars, were 
being offered contracts worth in excess of $1 million annually. In February of 1989, 
Roger Clemens signed a contract worth $7.5 million over three years to become the 
highest paid player in baseball. By December of that year, he was the seventh highest 
paid. "When salaries got to one million dollars (in 1980), I said that was the top," 
says Toronto Blue Jay president Paul Beeston. "Then it hit two million. Now, who 
knows?" 43  
Unlike the 1980s, when player income exploded while the average American’s 
income stagnated, the 1990s were prosperous for all. The median family income rose by 
2.2 percent annually between 1995 and 2000; a dramatic increase over the average of 0.4 
percent it had risen annually in the previous two decades. However, it was the wealthiest 
in society whose income grew the most. From 1995 until 1999, the wealthiest one percent 
of Americans saw their salary grow by 59 percent, as opposed to a nine percent increase 
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for the bottom half. The economy was booming in the late 1990s and this allowed for 
even more money to flow into MLB and into the pockets of the owners.44 
Owners were able to afford the increasing salaries because the popularity of the 
game was causing a huge increase in the revenue that they were generating. 
Merchandising, media and television contracts as well as the growing demand for luxury 
boxes at games were all feeding nearly $20 million in revenue to each team per year. It 
had also become profitable to win in baseball. The Oakland A’s lost $15.5 million in 
1983 and 1984. Over the next few years they invested in elite coaches, better scouting 
and player development and more aggressive marketing strategies. Combined with the 
reduced salaries caused by collusion, by 1989 these moves led to Oakland not only 
reclaiming their position as one of the most successful teams on the field, they had also 
become one of the most profitable.45 
This explosion of salaries counteracted the tactics used by the smaller market 
teams, such as Oakland, and diminished their opportunities for profitability. It was a 
common belief among the owners, especially those in large and wealthy markets, that any 
redistribution of profits to poorer clubs should come from the players first and the 
wealthy owners second. When the Basic Agreement of 1990 expired at the end of 1993, 
the owners were concerned with the well-being of the smaller owners and with their own 
profitability. However, both sides agreed not to use a work stoppage prior to the 1994 
season, so that season began on time but without a Basic Agreement in place.46 
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The owners’ first offer to the players in June of 1994 proposed an equal share of 
revenue for the players and the owners, removal of the salary arbitration process, and the 
implementation of a salary cap, with some other provisions as well. One month later, the 
MLBPA countered with a reduction in arbitration to two years of service, an increase in 
minimum salaries and pension payments, as well as no salary cap. Following their 
counter proposal, the players set a strike deadline of August 12. When that day came the 
two sides had been unable to bridge the gap between their two positions.47  
The main issue was the creation of a salary cap, which the owners said was 
mandatory, while the players said they would not allow.48 Because there had been no 
progress, and because the players were upset that the owners failed to make a required 
$7.8 million payment to the players’ pension fund, the players struck. In the next month, 
the two sides met sparingly and with little progress. On September 14 Bud Selig, the new 
Commissioner of Baseball, cancelled the rest of the 1994 season, including the World 
Series.49 
The biggest issue facing the two sides in the winter after the cancelled season was 
the fact that for the first time, they were facing a black and white issue. Where previous 
issues in negotiation, such as free agency, compensation, and salary arbitration, had all 
offered the ability to meet in the middle with compromise, the salary cap was more 
dichotomous and neither side was willing to back down.50 
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The two sides were unable to reach an agreement throughout the winter, even 
after President Bill Clinton and Congress got involved. They began spring training in 
1995 with “replacement players” – largely consisting of minor league players and former 
major leaguers.51 However, the two sides were forced to come together when, on March 
31st, Judge Sonia Sotomayor issued a decree stating that the owners had not bargained in 
good faith and granted an immediate injunction against the owners. After this decision, 
the players agreed to return to work and the owners agreed not to lock them out. The start 
of the season was delayed until the end of April.52 
In 1996 the MLBPA and owners agreed to a new CBA which created the first 
attempt at revenue sharing between all of the teams. By 2001, each of the thirty teams 
was taxed based on their net revenue. Three-quarters of this revenue was distributed to all 
teams equally while the remaining 25 percent was given to those teams which had below-
average revenue.53 This revenue sharing was completely new to baseball and changed the 
league from an entirely free market system where each team was effectively left to its 
own devices to remain financially stable into a joint network in which the worst teams 
were supported by the best teams.54 
Interestingly, revenue sharing may have created a more imbalanced league in 
terms of the competitiveness of each team on the field. The teams which knew that they 
would not perform well in the upcoming season could trade or sell their most expensive 
players which would reduce costs, but also their performance and therefore their 
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performance-based revenues. However, the revenue-sharing program would pay that 
team more than if they had held on to their best players. In order to counteract this 
competitive imbalance, a luxury tax was created. The luxury tax was imposed on the five 
teams with the highest payroll. They each paid 35 percent of the amount by which they 
exceeded the payroll of the sixth largest team.55  
While it was not officially a salary cap, the luxury tax had a similar effect in that 
it reduced the spending of the wealthiest teams. Whereas a cap would have created a hard 
limit for all teams, the tax only punished the biggest spenders and still allowed for a 
faster growth in player salaries than a cap would have.56 This system was different from 
the NFL’s cap which set a hard limit on the amount that any team could spend on players 
and also created a minimum amount that teams had to spend.57 No such minimum existed 
in MLB.  
Without a salary cap or other means of enforcing competitive balance, the 2000s 
saw the continued expansion of the gap between the best teams and the worst. While 
some teams have not made the playoffs in a decade, or three, other teams are perennial 
powers. These powerful teams, most notably the New York Yankees and the Boston Red 
Sox, simply spend more on players than their competitors are capable of spending in 
order to attract the best players to their teams. While not every marquee free agent ends 
up in New York, Boston or another big market, it is generally remarkable when a smaller 
team signs such a player. 
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The 2011-2012 offseason saw the signing of two of the best hitters in the game 
for extremely large contracts, and neither of them signed with the Yankees or Red Sox. 
Albert Pujols left St. Louis and the team for which he had set records with his consistent 
productivity in order to sign a ten-year $254 million deal with the Los Angeles Angels of 
Anaheim.58 Pujols’s career batting average at the time he signed was .316 and his only 
season in which he hit below .300 was in 2011 when he hit .299. He also had 445 home 
runs and at 32 years of age, was projected to have plenty of productivity left.59  
The Angels organization was able to sign Pujols to this large contract because of a 
television deal which they signed just prior to reaching their agreement with him. That 
deal was worth over $50 million annually and actually allowed the Angels to sign the 
best pitching free agent as well in CJ Wilson for five years and $77.5 million. Prince 
Fielder also left his former team, the Milwaukee Brewers, to sign a nine year $214 
million contract with the Detroit Tigers. Fielder, a career .282 hitter with 230 home runs 
in only six Major League seasons, was considered the second biggest free agent on the 
market.60 
In the pursuit of these two players, teams knew that they would have to offer 
massive contracts if they wanted to sign Pujols, Fielder, or even Wilson. Yet some teams 
were unable to spend the kind of money necessary to attract a top level free agent. In 
2012, there will be five teams which spend less than $50 million in total on their team 
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salaries.61 Yet at the same time, the Angels will spend approximately $40 million on just 
the contracts of their two newly acquired stars. This discrepancy was made possible by 
the lack of balance and revenue sharing in Major League Baseball.  
This spending came in spite of the fact that the US was several years into a 
significant recession and the national unemployment rate hovered around 9%, as it had 
for over two years.62 The success and popularity of baseball had reached a point where 
the MLBPA and owners were at least partially protected from the influence of the 
economy and relied on the popularity of the sport to generate ever increasing revenue. 
The players had successfully fought for their rights to free agency, and had then 
successfully fought for fair payment and equal partnership with the owners as well. They 
had done all of that by emphasizing the rights of each individual player to act on his own 
accord and by arguing with the owners for a completely open market. 
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Chapter 5 – The Season That Almost Wasn’t 
In 1987, Tex Schramm told NFLPA executive director, Gene Upshaw, with 
regard to free agency that “You’re not going to get it! You’re not going to get it in five 
years, you’re not going to get it in ten years, you’re not ever going to get it. Don’t you 
see? You’re the cattle, we’re the ranchers!”1 Schramm, the General Manager of the 
Dallas Cowboys, had been negotiating with Upshaw during the players’ strike. And yet, 
by 1993 the players and owners had agreed to a new CBA which created a free agency 
system along with a salary cap for total player salaries. Both sides were not completely 
happy with the new deal because they had to give up something important to get 
something in return. However, it turned out to be beneficial for everyone involved.2  
The new CBA granted complete freedom to move from team to team to any 
player who played out his contract and had more than four years of experience in the 
NFL. Any player who played out his contract with less than four years of experience 
would become a restricted free agent. Unlike Major League Baseball’s arbitration system, 
which only allowed the player to negotiate with his own team, restricted free agents were 
free to negotiate with any team that they chose. If they signed an agreement with another 
team, their original team had the right to match that offer as long as they had tendered a 
qualifying offer at the beginning of the restricted-free agency period.3 If the team chose 
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not to match the offer, the new team would have to compensate the old team with a draft 
pick in the next amateur draft. The quality of the pick was determined by the quality of 
the player and the amount of money in his new contract.4 
In order to achieve this level of freedom which they had never before enjoyed, the 
players were required to make concessions. The first was the salary cap, which limited 
the amount that each team could spend on its players and therefore the amount that the 
league as a whole could spend. The cap was structured through a revenue sharing system 
which limited the salaries of the entire league to 67 percent of the designated league gross 
revenue, which consisted of profits from ticket sales and television deals. After player 
salaries and benefits reached the 67 percent level, they would be incrementally forced 
down year by year to 62 percent. Teams were also required to spend a minimum of 58 
percent of their designated revenues on player salaries and benefits each year every year 
that had a cap in place.  That minimum level of spending on player salaries reflected the 
NFLPAs desire to benefit all of the players and reach a higher level of pay for all of 
them, not just the best players.5  
Another limit on player movement was the “Franchise Player” tag, which allowed 
each team to restrict one of their players from becoming a free agent for one year.6 
Whenever a player was tagged as a franchise player, he was given a one-year contract 
worth the average of the five highest paid players at his position, or a 20 percent increase 
in his previous salary, whichever was greater. The franchise tag was meant to be a 
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protection for those teams which felt that their best player was about to leave in free 
agency and that they may not be able to re-sign him. A similar tag, called the “transition 
tag,” was available in the first, second, and final years of the CBA and allowed the team 
to retain a player for the average salary of the top ten at his position or 120 percent of his 
previous salary.7  
Interestingly, the salary cap and other provisions of the new CBA were not 
applicable in every year of the agreement. The teams and players agreed to play the first 
year of the agreement without any cap at all. The reasoning was that it would allow for a 
significant increase in player salaries, enough to reach the 67 percent of the designated 
revenue mark, and therefore enact the salary cap and floor the following season.8 This 
unrestricted year allowed the defending Super Bowl champion Dallas Cowboys to re-sign 
their star running back Emmitt Smith, who held out at the beginning of the season, as 
well as other top-free agents and make another Super Bowl run. The back-to-back 
champions labeled themselves “America’s Team” and quickly became a polarizing team 
for the entire nation.  Fans either liked their entertaining, and successful, style of play, or 
disliked the brash attitudes of the players and owner, Jerry Jones.9   
The final year of the CBA was also set out as a cap-less year. This was meant to 
be used as motivation for the owners to reach an agreement with the players on a new 
CBA or an extension prior to that final year. Similarly, the players faced the extension of 
restricted free agency from four to six years in the event that the CBA reached its final 
year. Furthermore, the four teams which played for the Conference championships the 
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previous year would not be allowed to enter the free agent market, except to replace a 
player who departed via free agency. Both sides were trying to create a system which 
would prevent further labor stoppages by preventing the CBA from even reaching its 
final year.10  
Both the players and the owners were upset at what they were required to give up 
in order to reach an agreement. The owners had fought against the adoption of free 
agency for so long that Carmen Policy, president and CEO of the San Francisco 49ers, 
said “To accept free agency is worse than having to go through chemotherapy. 
Chemotherapy’s supposed to cure cancer, whereas free agency’s a form of cancer 
itself.”11 Some players were just as upset about the introduction of a salary cap. Michael 
Irvin, a star wide receiver for Dallas, viewed the cap as a limit on the salaries of star 
players more than regular players. He said “free agency with a cap is like no free 
agency.”12 
In spite of the fears from both sides, the new CBA oversaw one of the most 
successful decades in NFL history. The league brought in more money and saw more 
competitive balance than ever before and was able to expand by several franchises during 
the decade. During the first free agency period in 1993, nearly 120 players changed 
teams. Those players saw an average salary increase of 125 percent. The owners’ worry 
that all of the players would immediately flock to the largest city and largest contract 
available turned out to be largely unfounded. Pro Bowl defensive end Pierce Holt turned 
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down an offer from the New York Jets in order to take a smaller offer from the Atlanta 
Falcons, a team that had been the worst defensive team in the league the previous year.13  
Strangely enough, the 1990s were not only a time in which players were able to 
change their locations; teams exercised their rights to move as well. The NFL consisted 
of 27 cities in 1993 and after the CBA was settled, the league announced that it would 
expand. Baltimore, which had lost the Colts franchise to Indianapolis in 1984, was 
considered a strong candidate to receive a franchise. However, the expansion franchises 
were awarded to Charlotte, North Carolina and Jacksonville, Florida. Baltimore and St. 
Louis, another city which had lost a franchise and felt that they deserved a new one, were 
both shocked and upset with the decisions and with what they said was patronizing 
treatment from the league.14 
Following the awarding of two new franchises in the Southwest, teams began to 
move around the country. In April of 1995 the Los Angeles Rams, citing their poor-
quality stadium and lack of popularity while playing in Anaheim, left for St. Louis to 
replace the Cardinal franchise which had moved to Arizona a decade before. In order to 
attract the Rams, St. Louis promised to build a new domed stadium, a high-end practice 
facility and grant 100 percent concession revenue to the franchise, among other perks. 
The state of California, and particularly the Los Angeles area could not compete with 
these offers because the recent streak of riots and earthquakes made the political climate 
unfavorable to spending money on a football franchise.15  
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With the Rams gone, the Raiders were left as the only franchise in Los Angeles. 
As the rap movement of the 1990s grew, Raider memorabilia became an acceptable sign 
of street toughness, but without the drawback of attracting police attention or inciting 
violence in the same way that open affiliation with a gang may have. However, the hip-
hop community’s consumption of Raider gear did not translate into ticket sales. This lack 
of attendance combined with an old and outdated stadium caused the Raiders to move 
their franchise back to Oakland in June of 1995. In a single offseason, the second largest 
TV market in the nation had lost both of its professional football teams.16 
In reaction to the two moves out of Los Angeles, Cleveland Browns owner Art 
Modell said “We can’t hopscotch franchises around the country. We have built this 
business on the trust of fans.”17 On November 3, 1995 news leaked that Modell had 
signed an agreement to move his franchise to Baltimore and become the Baltimore 
Ravens. The promise of a new franchise by 1999 did little to assuage the anger of the 
Cleveland fans. They showed up to the last home game as if it were their “brother’s 
funeral.”18 
In 1997, the Houston Oilers left a solid fan base in Texas to move to the unproven 
cities of Memphis and then Nashville, Tennessee. There, they were renamed the 
Tennessee Titans. As angry as fans may have been whenever one of their favorite players 
left their team, they were even more upset when an entire team left town.19 Cleveland’s 
move to Baltimore was “particularly wrenching for Browns fans who had supported the 
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team for the past 50 years.”20 Six franchises had either been established or moved 
locations in only three years, a level of turnover and expansion that the league had not 
seen in decades.21 
In spite of the franchise movement and subsequent chaos and fan unrest, the NFL 
continued to prosper in the 1990s. The new balance in the CBA allowed the league’s 
smallest teams like the Green Bay Packers, located in a town of approximately 100,000 
people, to remain competitive with teams in large cities like New York, Chicago, and 
Dallas. The Packers were able to attract marquee free agents away from other teams. 
Reggie White, an All-Pro defensive end from the Philadelphia Eagles, left to join the 
Packers and was a key part of their championship team in 1996.22 Teams like the Packers 
were able to survive because the salary cap and other measures which restricted the cost 
of players and the revenue sharing which provided as much as 84 percent of their 
income.23 
The ability of the players to move among teams on their own volition, combined 
with the use of a salary cap in fact helped to balance the competition in the league, rather 
than to ruin it as the owners had predicted. In the 19 Super Bowls that have come after 
the 1993 CBA, 12 different teams have won, the same number of teams that won during 
the 27 years prior to free agency. The number of repeat champions also fell from six prior 
to 1993 to two since then.24 The league had become more balanced.  
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Gone were the days when a team would grow and play together for years and 
years in order to become as good as possible. The new system meant that every roster had 
significant turnover each year. This turnover meant that the success of a team was more 
fleeting than it had been in the past. A team that may have been average one year could 
win a Super Bowl the next. Likewise, a team which played in the Super Bowl one year 
may not make the playoffs the next year. In fact, from 1998 until 2007 seven of the teams 
that lost the Super Bowl did not make the playoffs the next year, or even win half of their 
games.25 For coaches and teams, the ability to find the right players to add to their team 
became more important than the ability to teach players the correct set of skills.26 
A testament to the success of the 1993 CBA was the fact that not only did the 
league grow at an unprecedented rate, but the owners and players were able to settle 
subsequent labor negotiations with little turmoil. The two sides agreed to simply continue 
the 1993 CBA through 2007, knowing that the success of the agreement was mutually 
beneficial. In 2007, another CBA was agreed upon without much controversy between 
the two sides. Commissioner Tagliabue, who was nearing retirement at the time, was 
suspected of pushing through the new CBA without allowing for much discussion in 
order to prevent another work stoppage from marring his legacy. Because the CBA was 
agreed to so quickly, little was changed from the previous agreement which had been 
established sixteen years prior.  
In May of 2008, the owners voted unanimously to reduce the length of the CBA 
by two years. The reduction meant that the CBA would run through the 2010 season and 
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2011 NFL amateur draft.27 This move showed the owners were unhappy with the CBA 
and wanted significant changes in the near future. The main issues were the league’s $9.3 
billion in revenue and how to split it with the players and how to slow the rapidly 
increasing rookie wages.28 
The 2006 CBA gave the players approximately 60 percent of the revenue that the 
league generated.29 Unhappy with their share of that revenue, the owners were 
threatening to lock the players out at the end of the now shortened CBA unless they 
reached an agreement which was more favorable to the owners. In addition to the 
massive revenue generated during the 2010 season, the league also broke multiple 
television viewership records, including the most watched broadcast in the history of US 
television at 111 million viewers for the Super Bowl.30 Public opinion at the time thought 
that a work stoppage would be ill-advised because according to DeMaurice Smith, the 
executive director of the NFLPA “no one wants to kill the golden goose.”31 However, 
Smith had a note written by his predecessor from a 1991 union meeting which read “The 
owners will always take short-term loss for long-term gain,” and Smith was always aware 
of that mentality when preparing his tactics.32 
Owners were concerned that they were giving too much of the revenue to the 
players, especially the early draft picks who had not played in the league at all and 
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therefore were unknown quantities. St. Louis Rams quarterback Sam Bradford, the first 
overall pick in the 2010 draft, signed a contract which gave him $78 million over six 
years before he ever stepped onto a NFL field.33 In September of 2010 Tom Brady, a two 
time Super Bowl MVP, signed a four-year deal worth just over $75 million.34 To solve 
this problem the two sides began to discuss the idea of a rookie wage scale which would 
cap the amount of money that could be spent on each pick in the draft. The estimated 
savings could be as high as $200 million per year.35 The issue that would then arise was 
what to do with that money. The owners wanted to keep it while the players would have 
rather seen it go to veteran players or into the pension fund for the retired NFL players.36 
The owners also wanted to take about $1 billion out of the pool that they shared 
with the players prior to dividing that pool. That money would go to the construction of 
new stadiums which were increasingly being built solely with private money. Players 
countered that workers were not asked to help finance the construction of factories, and 
they did not want to be first union to do so. In order to sway the players, the owners 
offered them a slightly larger proportion of the remaining revenue; essentially a bigger 
piece of a smaller pie. The players were unconvinced by this proposal, saying that they 
like the bigger pie just fine.37 
The provisions which had been enacted to prevent the expiration of a CBA 
without a further agreement came into effect when the 2009 season ended and no deal 
had been struck. That meant that the 2010 season would be an uncapped year, which was 
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good news for the players and bad news for the owners who wanted to win, particularly 
those in small markets. However, there was a silver lining for the frugal owners: the 
salary floor was removed along with the salary cap, meaning that they were free to cut 
costs and try to save money for the potential work stoppage that was a year away.38 
The lack of a new CBA at the end of the 2009 season also meant that the 
restricted free agency requirement was extended from four years to six years. Players 
who had set up their contracts to end so that they would have the right to unlimited free 
agency were once again forced to negotiate with teams knowing that their own team 
could retain their rights or demand compensation. All told, there were 76 starters and 130 
backup players who were up for restricted free agency that would have been eligible for 
complete free agency with the four-year system in effect. Even the unrestricted free 
agents were going to face limited benefits from being on the market. The eight teams 
which had played for the longest into the playoffs the previous season were limited to a 
combined four free agents unless they lost one of their own to free agency. This limited 
the pool of teams looking for the talents of each free agent.39  
Prior to the 2010 season, the owners attempted to dismantle a Supplemental 
Revenue Sharing (SRS) pool, which helped between eight and twelve of the league’s 
smaller-revenue clubs. The owners claimed that the uncapped season in 2010 did not 
require the pool under the 2006 CBA. The NFLPA disagreed, saying that they had to 
agree to any decision which was a part of current CBA, and Special Master Stephen 
Burbank agreed. The players saw the move by the owners as an attempt to limit the 
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amount of money which would be spent in free agency by limiting the money available to 
the poorer teams. This attempt to limit free agency spending was viewed as a hostile 
tactic to break the players in the upcoming negotiations over a new CBA.40 
Throughout 2010, the two sides met on occasion and discussed the coming 
expiration of the CBA, however little was actually accomplished. In February of that 
year, the new executive director of the NFLPA, DeMaurice Smith, was asked what the 
likelihood of a lockout during the 2011 season was on a scale of one to ten. His response 
was fourteen.41 In late October, halfway through the season, the situation had not 
improved and Commissioner Goodell said he “would like to see more progress” 
regarding the negotiations.42 In early December, Smith wrote a letter to the NFLPA 
regarding the ability to reach an agreement with the owners which said “That deadline 
has now passed.”43  
The deadline at which the existing CBA was set to expire was the end of the day 
on March 3, 2011. Prior to that deadline the two sides spent more time in court trying to 
gain leverage than they did in a room actually negotiating. One key decision was handed 
down on March 1 and said that the owners would not have access to the $4 billion in 
revenue from their television agreements.44 This removed a significant piece of leverage 
which the owners had used in previous disputes. The players won the decision on the 
argument that the owners had structured the deal to provide themselves with protection in 
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case of a lockout, rather than making a good-faith effort to maximize the revenues which 
would be shared with players, a stipulation of the agreement between the two sides.45  
On March 3, an agreement was reached to delay the expiration of the CBA for 
seven days. Yet the new deadline passed anyway without any agreement in place. As 
soon as the CBA expired, negotiations ended between the two sides, the owners locked 
the players out. In response, the NFLPA decertified. When the union decertified, the 
players were allowed to file antitrust lawsuits against the NFL, which they did 
immediately, with the goal of preventing the lockout via injunction.46 The major lawsuit 
was filed with ten players listed as plaintiffs. The three biggest names among those 
plaintiffs were Super Bowl-winning quarterbacks Tom Brady, Peyton Manning, and 
Drew Brees. Another player worth noting in that case was Von Miller. Miller was 
significant because the team he had most recently played for was Texas A&M University 
– that is, he was a rookie who had yet to be drafted and yet he was willing to assist in 
suing the NFL owners.47 
Because the already strained negotiations had broken off completely and the only 
end to the dispute was through the courts, it became clear that there would not be a quick 
solution. Speculation that the 2011 season would be partly or completely missed only 
escalated with the expiration of the deal. One of the most optimistic views came from 
Kevin Mawae, the president of the NFLPA, who said “We sit here at a time of 
uncertainty and say, 'When will football be played?’ My answer to you as fans is I don't 
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know. My hope to you as the players' association president is that I believe that we will 
play in 2011 but under what system I do not know."48 
As the lockout stretched on and little progress was made, the players and owners 
became more and more urgent in their attempts to reach an agreement. The spring had 
largely been spent in courtrooms arguing instead of boardrooms negotiating. In the early 
summer, at the behest of Robert Kraft who owned the New England Patriots, the two 
sides agreed to “get the lawyers out of the room” and sign a deal.49 With both sides 
working toward finding a mutually beneficial agreement instead of defending their own 
interests and vilifying their opponents, they were able to reach an agreement in only a 
few weeks.50 
In late July 2011, the two sides came together to agree to a decade-long 
agreement which included considerable changes to the way in which players and their 
teams interacted. Revenue sharing was resolved by removing the exemptions to the 
revenue pool which owners had previously reserved and reducing the share of the pool 
which went to the players. The players took a smaller piece of a bigger pie. Rookie wages 
were restricted by assigning each team a total amount that they could spend on their draft 
picks, based on their draft position. The $150 million that this was expected to save 
would be redirected into the contracts of veteran players. Additionally, the number and 
duration of practices were limited to prevent injuries and extend careers and contracts 
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were restructured so that there was some level of protection for players in case they were 
injured.51  
With this new deal, the most popular and profitable league in the US reached an 
agreement which appeared to assure labor peace for the next decade and did so without 
missing any regular season games. However, the state of the game had changed from the 
previous major work stoppage. Much like the MLBPA, the NFL players had shifted the 
negotiations from a fight for their financial liberty and the right of the current players to 
choose their teams to a fight over the equality of the partnership between the players and 
owners and the safety of those players. Yet the NFLPA had used very different tactics to 
do so.  Rather than trying to create a completely free market like baseball with little 
restriction on who could sign players and how much they could spend, the NFL had a 
restricted system which gave more power to role players and did not fully strip teams of 
their ability to maintain their team.  Part of the difference between the two leagues could 
be attributed to the style of the two sports and the impact that one player can have on a 
team.  To say that the previous two decades had been good for the state of the game and 
for both sides of the CBA would be an understatement. 
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the owners of the NFL and MLB each 
created systems which would heavily restrict the movement of players between teams.  In 
doing so, they turned the players into a form of property to be bought, sold, and traded.  
This system of restriction denied the players their rights as well as reducing their income.  
While players in both leagues would earn more money than the typical citizen of the day, 
they were still making a pittance compared to the income the owners received from the 
teams, and they still had no choice on where or for whom they worked.1   
A century later, players in both leagues made millions of dollars per year.  While 
still subject to being purchased, sold, and traded, they had fought for and earned the right 
to seek employment among the many teams in each league and in doing so had a voice in 
where they would play. Furthermore, they were able to begin to fight for benefits like 
pensions, injury guarantees in their contracts, and minimum salaries. That progress had 
come through repeated labor struggles over the previous 40 years.  Those labor struggles 
were initially the players struggling against the oppression of the owners and their reserve 
systems.2 
Established by the owners in order to “maintain the integrity of the game and 
maintain honesty among clubs and players,” the restrictive reserve clauses in each league 
                                                 
1
 Michael MacCambridge, America’s Game: The Epic Story of How Pro Football Captured a Nation (New 
York: Anchor Books, 2005); Bowie Kuhn, Hardball: The Education of a Baseball Commissioner (New 
York: Random House, 1987). 
2
 Ibid. 
78 
 
 
 
would remain in place throughout the first half of the 20th century.3  When professional 
baseball and football were gaining prominence, there was absolutely no restriction on 
player movement, creating a chaotic system with little stability. In order for the teams to 
maintain fan interest, they needed to field consistent teams and not be constantly 
worrying about their players jumping to another team. The reserve clause was established 
to create this stability; first in baseball and then in other sports as they modeled 
themselves after the most popular team sport of the day.  Those leagues that could create 
stability were able to generate fan support, make money and therefore outlast their 
competition.4 
The NFL and MLB’s respective systems that restricted player movement would 
be torn down over time as the players formed unions and began to demand fairness from 
the owners.  In the early part of the 20th century, players had sued both leagues 
unsuccessfully in attempts to establish free agency. Through the use of labor stoppages, 
negotiation, and further litigation the players in both leagues would eventually earn the 
right to play for the team that they wanted.  Over the next two decades the two leagues 
fought with their players over how to protect the owners from the salaries which had 
grown considerably as a result of free agency.  The two leagues adopted very different 
systems for handling the cost of players’ salaries.5   
Players had fought against the leagues and their oppressive reserve clauses even at 
the beginning of the 20th century. Yet it was not until 1969 when All-Star outfielder Curt 
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Flood of the St. Louis Cardinals refused a trade to Philadelphia and instead sued Major 
League Baseball, that the players were able to significantly challenge the restrictive 
system. Because of who he was, as a successful player on a successful team as well as a 
black player, and when he sued, at the height of the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, 
Flood’s suit against MLB made the most successful claim against the reserve clause to 
date.   
Flood said that he was tired of feeling like a piece of property and that he, as a 
human being, had certain rights which the reserve clause violated.6 Despite his lucrative 
salary, he claimed that he and other players were enslaved because they had no freedom 
to choose for themselves. While Flood was unsuccessful in his attempt to tear down the 
reserve clause, the decision of the Supreme Court made it clear that the clause was not 
infallible.7  Within a few years, the reserve clause would be struck down and the two 
sides would create a free agency system through which many players immediately were 
able to change teams and receive higher salaries.   
Unlike the MLBPA, the players’ union in the NFL relied on the continuity of the 
players as a group more than the influence of one star to earn their own free agency.  The 
players were first granted free agency after a strike in the mid-1970s.  While they would 
forego that right during negotiations in order to receive better benefits from the owners. 
Their general mode of negotiation was to present a united front and stand together. They 
went on strike again in 1982 in an attempt to earn guaranteed salaries, resulting in a 
shortened season.  By 1987, they again desired free agency and struck once more. That 
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time, the owners employed replacement players in order to continue playing the games 
and break the union sooner than they had in 1982.   
After their successful breaking of the strike in 1987, NFL owners felt that they 
would not be forced to allow free agency to the players.  The players, having lost in their 
use of both negotiations and work stoppages, returned to the courts to continue the fight.  
In 1993, after victories in multiple court cases the players finally got a CBA that included 
free agency.  As baseball players had eighteen years prior, football players would have 
the right to choose where they worked and the ability to leave a team if they felt it was 
necessary to do so.   
The free agency system created in MLB was very beneficial to the players. It was 
a sign that the owners had to treat them as people rather than possessions and gave them 
power over their own future. Immediately after it was accepted, they saw tremendous 
increase in their salaries, but that was at the expense of the owners’ profit margins.  
Because of the lack of restrictions on the free agent market, there was little to prevent the 
owners and their spending from spiraling out of control.  Their attempts to limit this 
spending included collusion in the 1980s which resulted in litigation, damages paid to 
players, and further cementing of the free agency system.  Following this failure, the 
owners began to try to control themselves through negotiations with the players, often 
advocating for a salary cap.  Eventually this led to the cancelation of the second half of 
the 1994 season, including the World Series.  The owners never were successful in 
81 
 
 
 
creating a salary cap, but did establish a luxury tax which deterred teams from being 
among the five highest spenders in the league.8   
Much like the players in MLB, football players received tremendous benefit from 
free agency.  However, the owners would not agree to any free agency system which did 
not include more restrictions than MLB’s system had.  The most obvious was the creation 
of a salary cap which no team could exceed for any reason.  In baseball, a team could 
spend as much as they liked so long as they had enough money to pay the salary and any 
accompanying tax.  The NFL would not allow for such an unrestricted, and inherently 
unfair, system.  Instead, they would place every team on equal footing in order to ensure 
balance.  Teams in wealthy markets could not spend their way to success. Other 
restrictions included the franchise tag and similar provisions which protected teams from 
their best players leaving via free agency.  In spite of these restrictions, NFL players were 
still able to move about the league; to attract offers from multiple teams and therefore 
make more money.  The new CBA also guaranteed that the players would be given a 
minimum share of the revenue from the league. 
After free agency was created in both leagues, the players began fighting for equal 
shares of the revenue, pensions, safety standards and other benefits.  Both leagues saw an 
unprecedented growth in their revenues, even during difficult economic times, and 
popularity.  With new CBAs in place and the continued popularity of both games, it is 
likely that the NFL, MLB, and both players unions will continue to have tremendous 
success for years to come. 
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